Turvallisten ja luotettavien koodihilojen lukuteoreettinen ja geometrinen suunnittelu langattomassa viestinnässä by Karrila, Alex
Aalto University
School of Science
Degree Programme in Engineering Physics and Mathematics
Alex Karrila
Number-theoretic and Geometric Lattice
Code Design for Secure and Reliable
Wireless Communications
Master’s Thesis
Espoo, October 20, 2015
Supervisor: Professor Camilla Hollanti
Advisor: Professor Camilla Hollanti
Aalto University
School of Science
Degree Programme in Engineering Physics and Mathematics
ABSTRACT OF
MASTER’S THESIS
Author: Alex Karrila
Title:
Number-theoretic and Geometric Lattice Code Design for Secure and Reliable
Wireless Communications
Date: October 20, 2015 Pages: vi + 85
Major: Mathematics Code: Mat-1
Supervisor: Professor Camilla Hollanti
Advisor: Professor Camilla Hollanti
In data transmissions over wireless channels, the signal quality is weakened by
random fading and noise of the electric field. This intrinsic property of the channel
poses a challenge as the transmitted messages should be decodable at the receiver.
On the other hand, it can be utilized for physical-layer security, in which the cor-
rect decoding probability drastically decreases when the signal quality weakens,
hence securing the message from unintended receivers farther away. In this the-
sis, we study the design of lattices for lattice codes with an emphasis on lattice
coset codes mostly in the Rayleigh fast fading channel model. Good lattice codes,
i.e., solutions to the legitimate receiver’s problem are known based on number-
theoretic lattice constructions, whereas the design of lattice coset codes providing
also physical-layer security is an open problem.
We begin with a review of basic information theory, providing existence results
and performance bounds on codes. Then, we specialize in lattice codes and lattice
coset codes in wireless channels, deriving probability bounds for the legitimate
receiver’s error probability and the eavesdropper’s correct decoding probability.
In terms of these bounds, algebraic lattice constructions based on field extensions
perform well, and for such lattices the bounds yield number-theoretic optimiza-
tion problems. We study algebraic number theory extensively in order to have the
tools to construct algebraic lattices and formulate and compute the probability
bounds in terms of the properties of a given field extension. Finally, we com-
pute the number-theoretic invariants and the eavesdropper’s probability bound
for algebraic lattices to assess and geometrize the different number-theoretic ap-
proaches that have been suggested to predict the eavesdropper’s correct decoding
probability for lattice coset codes.
Keywords: Additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, algebraic
number theory, algebraic lattices, inverse norm sum, lattice
codes, lattice coset codes, lattice design, physical-layer se-
curity, Rayleigh block fading channels, Rayleigh fast fading
channels, reliability, wireless channels, wiretap channels
Language: English
ii
Aalto-yliopisto
Perustieteiden korkeakoulu
Teknillisen fysiikan ja matematiikan koulutusohjelma
DIPLOMITYÖN
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tekijä: Alex Karrila
Työn nimi:
Turvallisten ja luotettavien koodihilojen lukuteoreettinen ja geometrinen suun-
nittelu langattomassa viestinnässä
Päiväys: 20. lokakuuta 2015 Sivumäärä: vi + 85
Pääaine: Matematiikka Koodi: Mat-1
Valvoja: Professori Camilla Hollanti
Ohjaaja: Professori Camilla Hollanti
Langattomassa viestinnässä signaalinlaatua heikentävät sähkömagneettisten aal-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Most of today’s communications happens through wireless channels, and the
amount of transmitted data and connected devices constantly increases, pos-
ing a challenge to the designers of wireless systems. Wireless channels are
open in nature, which makes them particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping
on the one hand, and on the other hand to the weakening of the signal quality
both due to noise from external sources and fading of the electromagnetic
waves. The distinctive challenges and increasing demand make the study of
wireless communications one of the most important branches of contempo-
rary information theory, both industrial and academic.
In practically any information transmission scheme there are three main
objectives: efficiency, reliability, and security. This means that the trans-
mission of data should be fast and economically efficient, the data should be
received correctly with high probability, and it should be hard for an unin-
tended receiver to read the transmitted messages. As a starting point for
practical designs, it is highly conventional to use lattice coding in wireless
channels for efficiency and reliability reasons. This means roughly that m
subsequent values of the transmitted electric field can be regarded as the
components of a vector belonging to a lattice in Rm. This thesis considers
a few mathematical lattice design problems arising from the reliability and
security aims in the code design for wireless channels.
Having chosen lattice coding, the first lattice design problem addressed is
to find a lattice that yields as reliable lattice codes as possible, given certain
efficiency constraints. The answer depends of course on how fading and noise
are modelled, and good lattices are known in low dimensions for the simplest
channel models, the Gaussian and the Rayleigh fast fading channels, due
1
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to geometric and number-theoretic methods. In this thesis, we review the
known designs and in an ongoing related work not included in this text, we
generalize the geometric designs to slightly more complicated channel models
[17].
The second optimization problem, into which more effort is put in this
thesis, is related to the security objective. Traditionally, security has been
ensured by cryptography, which will however turn out to be useless if the
eavesdropper knows the key, and secretly distributing the key is not necessar-
ily straightforward in wireless communications. Alternatively, cryptography
based on products of large primes such as RSA could be cracked by quantum
computers. A possible solution to these problems that has gained increasing
interest is physical-layer security, in which the code is designed so that the
weakening of the signal-quality will drastically decrease the receiver’s abil-
ity to decode correctly. We study lattice design related to a physical-layer
security strategy called lattice coset coding.
When this thesis work was initiated, it had been suggested that secure
lattice coset codes could be designed by number-theoretic means and some
possible design criteria had been suggested, related to the invariants of the
underlying algebraic field extension called discriminant and regulator, and
the prime ramification of the extension. The original purpose of the thesis was
to introduce the necessary information theory and the number theory, with
an emphasis on the prime ramification, and then run numerical simulations
to compare the suggested design criteria.
In the course of studying lattice coset codes numerically, it turned out that
a probability bound on which the proposed number-theoretic designs were
based might be too loose in the sense that it does not necessarily correlate
with the actual performance of the lattice. Based on this, we studied what
kind of an alternative probability bound could be tighter, and gave a heuristic
geometric lattice design based on the tighter bound. The examination of the
earlier bound and number-theoretic design is considered in this thesis with
the negative result, whereas the proposed new designs and the geometric
design are considered in [15, 16] and mainly referred to in this thesis. This
structural choice was made since the approach of the article is somewhat
different from what we had adopted at the beginning of the thesis project.
1.2 Organization
In a very large scale, we tackle the lattice design problems by first deriving
expressions that we use as design criteria for lattices and showing that good
lattice constructions involve extensions of the rational field Q. Then, we
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study field extensions for a while from a purely mathematical point of view,
and in the end obtain a number-theoretic construction of lattices. Finally,
we put the two pieces together and formulate the lattice design criteria as
questions about field extensions in the case of algebraic lattices, and study
algebraic lattice codes with some computational examples.
Our approach is divided between the chapters as follows. In Section 2,
we present some very basic concepts of information theory that describe how
good solutions are achievable for the given communication problems in a very
general setting. Section 3 introduces the practical setup with wireless channel
models and lattice coding strategies, from which the main lattice design
problems and objective functions arise. Section 4 considers algebraic number
theory, starting and finishing with applications but otherwise written from
a purely mathematical point of view, with an emphasis on a phenomenon
called prime ramification. Finally, in Section 5, we are ready to numerically
evaluate codes based on algebraic lattice constructions.
As this thesis balances between mathematics and information theory, even
results that might seem elementary to a specialist of either field are stated,
typically without proof to save space, which in turn might be confusing for
an unaccustomed reader. Almost all omitted proofs are nevertheless doable
for an undergraduate student and, in addition, references are given.
Chapter 2
Motivation: communication prob-
lems
In this section, we present the real-life optimization problems of the thesis on
an informal level. We also review some very basic information theory to give
a quantization for the real-life problems, provide some fundamental bounds
for the solutions and, finally, motivate the choice of the so-called coset codes,
which are of interest later in this work. We refer to [5, 18] for details on
information theory.
2.1 An informal introduction
2.1.1 The reliability problem
In its most general form, the reliability problem asks for a way to transmit
information with a high speed and small error probability. Intuitively, there
seems to be a trade-off; if one is allowed to take risks, then one should also
be able to transmit information faster. Indeed, as we shall soon see, given a
channel model there is an upper bound for the data rate at which arbitrarily
small error rates can be achieved, called the channel capacity. In this result
the rate is measured in bits per channel use, not bits per second. From the
point of view of this thesis, the main content of this result is that optimizing
reliability makes sense and good solutions exist.
In a practical approach, achieving reliability in wireless communications
can be roughly divided in physical layer and error correction. The task of
physical-layer code design is to fix a way to convert data from the wireless
channel to a device that guarantees reasonably small decoding delays and a
fixed amount of transmitted bits per channel use, i.e., a beneficial conversion
4
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Figure 2.1: A schematic illustration of error correction and physical-layer
reliability design.
of units from bits per channel use to bits per second. Then, the objective is
to minimize the decoding error rate occuring in the conversion from channel
to device. In particular, physical-layer code design alone never achieves arbi-
trarily small error rates since decoding errors necessarily occur, and physical-
layer design does not directly address error correction by adding redundancy
in the transmitted data. Instead, a succesful physical-layer design gaurantees
a low decoding error rate so that less redundancy needs to be added to the
transmitted data in the error correction codes to achieve low bit error rates,
hence in the end contributing to a fast and reliable communication.
We only consider the physical-layer reliability problem of lattice codes, in
which subsequent values of the transmitted electric field are the coordinates
of a lattice point. The regular structure of the lattice allows fast decoding,
i.e., in practise finding the lattice point closest to the vector of received
noisy electric-field values. Then, we minimize the vector decoding error rate.
The interplay of error-correction and lattice coding in an example where
Alice transmits data to Bob is illustrated schematically in Fig. 2.1. With
this illustration at hand, we point out that also the bit labelling affects the
reliability of a lattice code: the bit vectors should be mapped to the lattice
points so that geometrically nearby lattice points correspond to nearby bit
vectors. This guarantees a benefial conversion from vector decoding error
rates to bit decoding error rates. Bit labelling is not addressed in this thesis,
and we talk about correct and wrong decoding always on the vector level.
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2.1.2 Information security
There are two main approaches to securing information, cryptography and
physical-layer security. The former one is based on changing the plaintext
into ciphertext by some injective function before sending it. The inverse of
this function is kept secret or difficult to find so that only the legitimate
receiver can convert the ciphertext into plaintext again. The alternative ap-
proach, physical-layer security, is based on the assumption that an intruder
receives the messages in lower quality, due to noise and in wireless commu-
nications also fading. Then, the coding system, i.e., the way the information
is encoded into the channel (e.g., into 0 − 1 impulses in a wire or electric-
field values in wireless communications) is chosen so that the messages are
blurred already by a moderate amount of noise and fading. Cryptography
and physical-layer security can of course be applied simultaneuosly. The
security part of this work considers only physical-layer security.
2.1.3 The wiretap problem
The wiretap scheme, which is the most common setup for physical-layer
security problems, was introduced by A. D. Wyner [31]. It can be roughly
described as follows. An encoded message is transmitted to its legitimate
receiver, while a wiretapper intercepts a version of this message with an
inferior signal-quality. The wiretapper is assumed to know the decryption
key, if any, but the transmitter and receiver can choose a suitable coding
system in order to maximize the wiretapper’s confusion due to the poor
signal quality.
In addition to maximizing the confusion, the transmitter and receiver
have to ensure that the probability of the receiver’s correct decoding is high
and the communication is fast, similarly to the reliability problem. This
generic scheme, even though named as if tapping a wire, is naturally highly
applicable and even more relevant in wireless communications, where any out-
sider can intercept the transmitted messages, and secretly delivering crypta-
tion keys is difficult. The main theorem of Wyner’s paper is, informally
stated, that with the very few assumptions on the setup, the legitimate re-
ceiver can gain information with asymptotically zero error probability and
asymptotically nonzero data rate, whilst the wiretapper’s received informa-
tion is asymptotically zero. Hence, in a wiretap setup, finding a good coding
system is just a matter of innovation with a fundamental limit only on the
data rate, but not on the reliability and security.
In what follows, we also use the established terminology where the sender
is called Alice, the legitimate receiver Bob, and the wiretapper is called Eve
CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION: COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS 7
or the eavesdropper.
2.2 Some basic concepts of information theory
In this subsection, a bit of information theory is presented in order to formal-
ize the setup and yield an understanding of Wyner’s result on a formal level,
as well as to motivate for the mathematical problems studies later on. The
results in this subsection are only utilized implicitly in the rest of this work,
in the sense that they guarantee the existence of an optimal code design.
2.2.1 Entropy and information
We begin with two essential definitions.
Definition 1. The (Shannon) entropy of a discrete X -valued random vari-
able X with probability distribution P is
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X ,P (x)>0
P (x) logP (x). (2.1)
The conditional (Shannon) entropy of a discrete X -valued random variable
X given a discrete Y-valued random variable Y is
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
P (y)
∑
x∈X ,P (x|y)>0
P (x|y) logP (x|y). (2.2)
The name “conditional entropy of X given Y ” is maybe somewhat mis-
leading to an unaccustomed reader in the sense that no value of Y is given.
A more precise but longer formulation would be, e.g., “the expectation of the
conditional entropy of X over all given Y ”.
Information theoretists like to emphasize the base of logarithms being 2,
not e. Since for any x, a, b ∈ R+ we have logb x = logb a loga x the different
interpretations of the log operator will only scale the Shannon entropy and
(as will be seen soon) the information by a constant. Hence, the base is
actually irrelevant for a mathematician. However, for a computer scientist,
the point is that if the base is two, then the entropy (conditional entropy)
gives the optimal compression of the information X (given Y ). To illustrate
this naively, if Alice observes a realization of the X -valued random variable
X with a known distribution and wants to tell Bob about her observation by
transmitting a sequence of zeroes and ones, she can encode more probable
realizations into shorter sequences so that the smallest expected amount of
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zeroes and ones she needs is H(X). This is known as Shannon’s source coding
theorem. Similarly, if Alice and Bob both know the realization of Y , and Alice
knows the conditional distribution ofX given Y , then Alice can communicate
the realization of X in analogously optimized sequences of zeroes and ones
that also depend on the realization of Y , with optimal expected sequence
length H(X|Y ). To give yet another description, the (conditional) entropy
tells how many bits the information of the realization of a random variable
X is worth (given Y ). In more general, letting the logarithms be of base
q ∈ Z≥2 instead of 2, the entropy yields the optimal compression in q-ary
alphabets instead of binary.
Remark 2. A combination of a finite number of discrete random variables
is a discrete random variable. Hence, Def. 1 actually also defines entropies
with several conditions, e.g. H(X|Y, Z).
We continue by listing some of the properties of the Shannon entropy.
Lemma 3. The entropy has the following properties:
i) The entropy of a probability distribution is always convergent (also for
countably infinite X ), and 0 ≤ H(X) for any random variable X. The
equality holds if and only if P (X) is a delta distribution.
ii) Given a finite set X , H(X) is maximized if and only if the probability
distribution P (x) is uniform.
iii) Conditioning reduces entropy, i.e., H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X) for any random
variables X and Y . The equality holds if and only if X and Y are
independent.
iv) The reduction in entropy caused by conditioning does not depend on
which variable is unknown and which gives the condition, i.e., H(X)−
H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
The parts iii−iv of Lemma 3 allow us to give the following quantification
of information.
Definition 4. The mutual information of the random variables X and Y is
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) = I(Y ;X). (2.3)
Similarly, the conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y, Z) = H(Y |Z)−H(Y |X,Z) = I(Y ;X|Z).
(2.4)
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Recalling the interpretation of entropy as optimal compression, the mu-
tual information tells how much the knowledge of Y reduces the optimal
compression of X. Hence, it can be roughly regarded as an information
theoretic measure of correlation; it is symmetric, and the heavier the “corre-
lation” ofX and Y , the larger this reduction in bits is. Conversely, by Lemma
3, the reduction in bits is zero if and only if X and Y are independent.
There is one more lemma concerning the entropy functional that is useful
for discrete memoryless channels. This is actually an easier special case of
the chain rule for entropy [See, e.g., [18], Appendix A].
Lemma 5. Let X1, ..., XN be independent random variables. Then, the en-
tropy of any single random variable H(Xi) and that of XN = (X1, ..., XN)
are related by
H(XN) =
N∑
i=1
H(Xi).
2.2.2 Discrete memoryless channels
From a general information-theoretic point of view, a channel is an entity
that transports information. Channels are subject to distortions, and hence,
if the input alphabet is X and the output Y , an abstract channel is de-
scribed by transition probabilities p(y|x). In discrete channels, the input and
output alphabets are finite. The channel is called memoryless if the tran-
sition probabilities are the same for all channel uses, not depending, e.g.,
on previously transmitted or received alphabetic values. In the language of
electromagnetism this means that the coherence time of the channel is less
than the time interval between the transmissions. For example, Shannon’s
noisy-channel coding theorem and Wyner’s results on the wiretap channel
[31] concern discrete memoryless channels. The fact that memorylessness
simplifies our computations is depicted by Lemma 5, stating essentially that
entropies, and hence also informations, related to subsequent independent
channel uses can be simply summed, and thus all importat information-
theoretic computations only need to consider a single channel use.
2.2.3 Channel capacity
Definition 6. The channel capacity C of a discrete memoryless channel
with given alphabetic transition probabilities is the best possible information
about a random input alphabet X that the channel can yield to a receiver,
i.e.,
C := sup
all PDFs P (x)
I(X;Y ).
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Figure 2.2: Wyner’s wiretap channel.
The channel capacity also gives the maximum rate (in bits per channel
use) at which information can be transmitted with an arbitrarily low error
probability. This is called Shannon’s noisy-channel coding theorem. Whereas
the source coding theorem quantizes the optimal compression, this theorem
should be regarded as a quantization of the optimal error-correction: given
the transition probabilities, how much actual data can we transmit per chan-
nel use and, conversely, how large a proportion of the transmission must be
covered by redundant content to combat errors. We are not going to use
this theorem directly, but it is one of the fundamental results of informa-
tion theory, stating that every model of a discrete memoryless channel has a
fundamental limit for the efficiency of information transition. Likewise, it is
a fundamental principle in information theory to first compress source data
and then add redundancy for transmission. These steps are called source
coding and channel coding, respectively.
2.2.4 Wyner’s theorem
We can now state Wyner’s result on the wiretap channel. Consider a channel
model as depicted in Fig. 2.2, with both channels discrete and memoryless.
Assume that k values of source alphabets from set S are compressed into n
values channel alphabets. The subsequent values of source alphabets are as-
sumed i.i.d. with “intrinsic” entropy H(S) := H. Then, the rate R at which
source data is transmitted is on average R = Hk/n bits per channel use. In
bits per source alphabet, the information that the eavesdropper falls short,
called equivocation, is H(Sk|Zn)/k. (Recall that H(Sk|Zn) is the optimal
compression of the random variable Sk given Zn.) A rate-equivocation pair
(R, d) is achievable, if there exist channel coding systems for which afore-
mentioned formulae for rate and equivocation can reach arbitrarily close to
R and d, respectively, with an arbitrarily small decoding error probability for
the legitimate receiver. Here “decoding error probability” is quantized as the
average of error probabilities of each component of Sk, i.e., 1/k
∑
` P (Bob’s
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guess Sˆk differs from Sk in `th component). Finally, let CM be the capacity
of the main channel from Alice to Bob. Then, the fundamental result of
wiretap channels is stated as follows.
Theorem 7. The achievable pairs (R, d) are given by
{0 ≤ R ≤ CM , 0 ≤ d ≤ H,Rd ≤ H sup
all PDFs P (x)
I(X;Y |Z)}. (2.5)
Note that the supremum only depends on the channel model, so in the
(R, d) plane, the achievable points are the intersection of a rectangle and the
subgraph of a hyperbola Rd ≤ constant. The upper-right corner of this do-
main, with large rate and equivocation, is particularly interesting. Motivated
by this, the largest rate R at which (R,H) is achievable is called the secrecy
capacity Cs — it is the best possible data rate that can be achieved with
arbitrarily little information leaking to the eavesdropper. The secrecy capac-
ity is positive, satisfying 0 < Cs ≤ CM , so in particular Wyner’s theorem
states that for any wiretap channel model, secure communication based on
only physical-layer security is possible. This is a very fundamental existence
result that can be informally crystallized in the words “physical-layer security
makes sense”.
2.2.5 Coset Coding
The information-theoretic foundation of coset coding presented in [25] is
based on the following simplified setup. Alice transmits a vector of k alpha-
betic values (x1, ...xk), of which Eve correctly receives a subset (xe1 , ..., xeµ)
of µ < k alphabets xej at some indices ej but obtains no knowledge of the
other components xj. Then, if the transmission arrangement contains “too
much information” in the sense that several different xk decode to the same
input alphabet, the arrangement can be chosen such that Eve’s information
is negligible.
Example 8. Assume that Alice encodes one bit into a two-bit vector, i.e.,
Sk = S = Z2 and X n = X 2 = Z2×Z2. She uses parity encoding f : S → X 2
based on random choice,
f(0) = choose{(0, 0), (1, 1)}
f(1) = choose{(0, 1), (1, 0)},
and a parity decoding,
f−1((a, b)) = a+ b, a, b, a+ b ∈ Z2.
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Now, it is elementary to check that if Eve only receives one channel alphabet,
e.g., (not received, 0), the original encoded bit is equally likely to have been
0 or 1, so Eve obtains no information.
A lattice analogue of modulo classes considered in the example above
are modulo classes of sublattices — lattices are considered rigorously in the
next section but the reader probably has an intuitive picture already at this
point. Hence, the redundancy is added to the channel alphabet by taking
the alphabet of a lattice Λb code to be the classes of Λb/Λe, where Λe is a
sublattice. For the utility of lattice coset coding, we refer to, e.g., [24]. For
a report of implementation in wireless channels, see [20].
Chapter 3
Lattice codes in wireless channels
In this section, we study lattice codes and lattice coset codes in three basic
models for wireless communications. The section is structured as follows.
First, we present some basic lattice theory and the gaussian, Rayleigh fast
fading and block fading channel models. Then, we derive the probability
bounds for the eavesdropper’s correct decision probability and the legitimate
receiver’s error probability for the respective channel models. These proba-
bilities provide the objective functions of the optimization problem that this
work considers.
3.1 Lattices
3.1.1 Basic concepts
We begin with a definition.
Definition 9. A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn.
Any point in a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn can be expressed in terms of a generator
matrix M ∈ Rn×m as follows
Λ = {x ∈ Rn | x = Mω,ω ∈ Zm}.
We assume that the columns ofM are linearly independent over Z and hence,
the lattice coordinates ω of a lattice point are unique and m is the dimension
of the lattice. If m = n, the lattice is of full rank. A sublattice of a lattice of
dimension m in Rn is an additive subgroup. It has a generator matrix MZ,
where Z ∈ Zm×k. Here k is the dimension of the sublattice and for a square
matrix Z [29],
|Λb/Λe| = | detZ|.
13
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The fundamental parallellotope FΛ of a lattice Λ is defined as
FΛ = {x ∈ Rn | x = Mω,ω ∈ (0, 1)n}.
The volume Vol(Λ) of the lattice Λ is the volume of the fundamental paral-
lellotope, given by
Vol(Λ) = | detM |
for full-rank lattices. For a general rank m,
Vol(Λ) =
√
det(bi · bj)mi,j=1,
where bi are the generator vectors. The volume of a lattice does not depend
on the choice of the fundamental parallellotope since if Λ has two different
generator matrices M and M ′, then the latter generates a sublattice, M ′ =
MZ with |Λ/Λ| = 1 = | detZ| and hence, | detM | = | detM ′|. The matrix
(bi ·bj)mi,j=1 is called the Gram matrix and it determines the geometry of the
lattice basis.
Remark 10. Differing from some information theory references, here vectors
are identified with column matrices and the lattice generator vectors with the
columns of the generator matrix M .
Definition 11. The dual lattice Λ? of a full-rank lattice Λ generated by M
is the one generated by
M−T := (M−1)T = (MT )−1.
The dual lattice is well-defined, in the sense that it does not depend on the
choice of the generator matrix; again if M ′ = MZ with |Λ/Λ| = 1 = | detZ|,
then
M ′−T = M−TZ−T .
Now, by Cramer’s rule for matrix inversion, Z−T is an integer matrix and
hence M ′−T generates a sublattice Λ′? of Λ?. Furthermore, 1 = | det I| =
| detZ detZ−T | = | detZ−T | = |Λ?/Λ′?|, so actuallyM ′−T andM−T generate
the same lattice.
Theorem 12 (The Poisson formula for lattices). Let Λ be a full-rank lat-
tice with generator M and let f : Rn → C be a continuous function with´
x∈Rn |f(x)|dnx < ∞ and
∑
t∈Λ? |fˆ(t)| < ∞ such that the partial sums of∑
t∈Λ |f(t + u)| converge uniformly whenever u is restricted onto a compact
set. Then, ∑
t∈Λ
f(t) = | detM |−1
∑
t∈Λ?
fˆ(t)
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where the Fourier transform is defined as
fˆ(t) =
ˆ
y∈Rn
e−i2piy·tf(y)dy.
Proof. The proof is given in [7]. We point out that the condition on the
continuity of f is essential.
3.1.2 Geometric properties
Lattices allow a variety of different mathematical approaches, ranging from
group theory to complex analysis and geometry. In this thesis, we mainly
consider the geometric approach.
Definition 13. The Voronoi cell V(t) of a lattice point t ∈ Λ is defined as
V(t) = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x−w‖ > ‖x− t‖ ∀ t 6= w ∈ Λ}.
Example 14. The Voronoi cells of the hexagonal lattice in R2 are open
regular hexagons. The Voronoi cells of a square lattice in Rn are open squares.
The following lemma concerning Voronoi cells is easy to prove, but it is
given here for completeness. The lemma could be directly generalized to
consider bounded sets that tile Rn under translations of t ∈ Λ or lattices
that are not of full rank, but neither one of these generalizations is necessary
later on.
Lemma 15. All Voronoi cells become V(0) under translation, V(t) − t =
V(0), so they have equal size. Furthermore, if the lattice is of full rank, the
size is given by
µ(V(0)) =
ˆ
y∈V(0)
dny = Vol(Λ) = | detM |.
Proof sketch. The first part follows easily from the self-similarity of the lat-
tice.
For the second part, it is easy to show that a Voronoi cell or a fundamental
parallellotope has a finite diameter. Then, consider all the N(R) lattice
points in B(0, R). The union of cells (parallellotopes) corresponding to these
parallellotopes is between the sets B(0, R − d) and B(0, R + d), where d is
the diameter of the cells (parallellotopes). Hence,
Vol(B(0, r − d)) ≤ N(R)Vol(D) ≤ Vol(B(0, R + d)),
where D is the parallellotope or the cell. These inequalities give upper and
lower bounds to Vol(F )/Vol(V(Λ)). Letting R→∞, we notice that the ratio
is one.
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Problem 16. Throughout this thesis, we call the sphere-packing problem the
problem of finding the densest lattice packing of non-intersecting spheres of
equal radius in Rn.
Equivalently, since from the definition it follows each Voronoi cell inter-
sects with exactly one sphere in the packing, the solution to the sphere-
packing problem in Rn maximizes Vol(B)/Vol(Λ), where B is the insphere of
the Voronoi cell, hence with diameter (radius) equal to (half of) the minimal
vector length of the lattice.
The following two definitions are more related to the theory of lattice
codes than lattice theory, but let us still present them here.
Definition 17. The `-product distance of (lattice) vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn),
x′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n) ∈ Λ differing in exactly ` components is defined as d`p(x,x′) =∏
xi 6=x′i |xi− x
′
i| . The quantity `(x,x′) is called the modulation diversity of x
and x′. The minimum of ` over the lattice Λ,
δ = min
x,x′∈Λ,x 6=x′
`(x,x′),
is referred to as the diversity of the lattice Λ. If δ = n, Λ is said to have full
diversity.
Definition 18. For full-diversity lattices, the minimum product distance is
defined as dp,min(Λ) = min06=x∈Λ
∏n
i=1 |xi| .
Remark 19. Let us illustrate the interpretation of the geometric concepts
presented here with a simplified example. In wireless communications, infor-
mation is coded into magnitudes of electric field components. Let us assume
that Alice and Bob agree on a transmitting arrangement in which n subse-
quent electric field values, regarded as a vector in Rn, always form lattice Λ
points x. The receiver measures a random vector Y = x + N corrupted by a
random noise N, and his natural guess for the original lattice point x is the
one with Y ∈ V(x). (Here we implicitly assumed that the noise vector N
has zero mean and its probability density is spherically symmetric and radi-
ally decreasing.) With this decoding, Bob decodes the vector x correctly iff
N ∈ V(0). Still assuming that the noise is spherically symmetric with a ra-
dially decreasing probability density, the sphere-packing radius then roughly
quantizes the probability of this event, i.e., the reliability of the code given
by this lattice.
Let us next study fading (wireless) channel models, in which the transmit-
ted vectors are streched by a random diagonal fading matrix diag(h1, ..., hn),
where the entries hi ≥ 0 are in the simplest case independent and identically
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distributed (i.i.d.). Hence, Bob receives Y = diag(h1, ..., hn)x+N, where it is
typically assumed that Bob knows diag(h1, ..., hn) but not N. By the preced-
ing channel model, we would then like the lattice diag(h1, ..., hn)Λ to have a
dense sphere packing, equivalently, long minimal vectors. Then, diversity dis-
cribes roughly how resistant vector lengths are to such fading, and hence the
diversity of a lattice describes the resistance of its sphere-packing radius. For
example, let x = (
√
n, 0, ..., 0) and x′ = (1, ..., 1) so that ‖x‖ = ‖x′‖ = √n.
Then, it is elementary to verify that E(‖diag(h)x‖2) = E((‖diag(h)x′‖2)) and
that Var(‖diag(h)x‖2) = n2Var(h21) whereas Var(‖diag(h)x′‖2) = nVar(h21),
so the length of a diverse vector is considerably more stable.
3.2 Channel models
3.2.1 The gaussian channel
In the following three subsections, we establish three different channel mod-
els. The gaussian model is a general noisy channel model, but for concrete-
ness, we motivate its use in the special case of wireless communications.
Assume that the information is encoded into values of a sinusoidal electric
field, which, containing a phase and a magnitude, can be collected into a
vector u of Cm. The received vector is blurred by an additive zero-mean
gaussian noise. Hence, the received vector w ∈ Cm is given componentwise
by
wi = ui + v
′
i,
where v′i ∈ C represents the noise. The zero-mean gaussian form of the
noise as an electric-field value, given by <v′i, is motivated by the central limit
theorem. Furthermore, since the noise certainly does not depend on the
phase of the transmitted wave, its complex representative v′i should hence
be a complex gaussian variable. The independence of the noise terms is an
assumption equivalent to the memorylessness of the channel.
All this can however be simplified to a real channel model. Consider a
transmitted vector u ∈ Cn and received w ∈ Cn. We can naturally identify
these with vectors x ∈ R2m (y ∈ R2m) by choosing <u1 = x1, <u2 = x2, ...,
=u1 = xn+1 etc. (<w1 = y1 etc.). Thus, we will in continuation study a real
model, where the received vector y ∈ R2m is given by
yi = xi + vi,
and vi are now i.i.d. zero-mean gaussian r.v. of variance σ2.
Let us yet consider briefly quantizing the “channel quality” of such a
channel. In the oscillating dipole model, which is the simplest model for an
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antenna, the squared length of the electric field vector is proportional to
the power flux carried by the wave. (For a mathematical formulation see,
e.g., [12].) With the vague notion of squares representing energy flux density
and the intuitive guess that this density determines the channel quality, the
natural measure for the channel quality is E{v2i } = σ2. In the wiretap setup,
Bob and Eve experience different noises and, by the basic assumption, i.e.,
Eve having an inferior signal quality, the mathematical formulation is then
σ2b < σ
2
e .
3.2.2 The Rayleigh block fading channel
The block fading model is a generalization of the gaussian one to include the
fading of the transmitted electric field. Then, after fading and additional
noise, the received vector w′ is given componentwise by
w′i = hiu
′
i + v
′
i,
where hi is a complex fading coefficient and v′i the complex noise term. We
make the following assumptions.
i) The variables hi and vi are complex zero-mean Gaussian random vari-
ables with variances σ2h and σ2, respectively. (The gaussian form of hi
is motivated by the large number of scatterers and the central limit
theorem.) The sending frequency is low enough to make the random
variables vi and hi i.i.d.
ii) Both Eve and Bob have a perfect channel state information (CSI), i.e.,
they know the complex fading coefficients hi.
After removing the phase of hi (assumption (ii)), the received message is
wi = |hi|ui + vi,
where |hi| is a real r.v. with parameter σh Rayleigh-distribution with the
probability density function
r(x) =
x
σh
exp
(
x2
2σ2h
)
. (3.1)
and vi is a complex zero-mean Gaussian r.v. with variance σ2 (assumption
(i)).
Next, we move over to a real model almost as in the gaussian case by
choosing <ui = xi,1, =ui = xi,2, so that X ∈ Rm×2. Similarly, choose
<wi = yi,1 and =wi = yi,2 Then, the received point of Y ∈ Rm×2 is given by
yi,j = |hi|xi,j + vi,j, j ∈ {1, 2},
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where vi,j is a real gaussian noise with variance σ2. In matrix notation, this
will simplify to
Y = diag|hi|X + V, (3.2)
where diag|hi| is a diagonal matrix of Rm×m with |hi| in the ith diagonal entry.
To have a broader applicability, assume that not 1 but instead L/2, where
L is even, transmitted complex numbers u′i are multiplied by each fading
coefficient hi. Physically, this is a simplification of a situation where the
electric field scatterers are quasi-static. Then, the above assumptions yield
the same equation (3.2) but with X,Y,V ∈ Rm×L. By channel interleaving
(see [23]) we can omit the assumption of L being even. This is the general
block-fading model.
Analogous to the AWGN channel, the natural way to describe channel
quality is given from the energy densities. The relevant signal has expected
square E{‖diag|hi|X‖2} ∝ E{|hi|2} and the noise a square proportional to
σ2. Thus, the ratio of the energies related to the actual signal and the noise
is described by E{h21}/E{v21} ∝ σ2h/σ2. For a rigorous but less intuitive
motivation for this measure of channel quality, the reader can verify that
Eve’s and Bob’s probability bounds given later in Section 3.3.4 only depend
on σ2h/σ2, given the lattice and sending constellation.
3.2.3 The Rayleigh fast fading channel
The Rayleigh fast fading channel is a variant of the block fading channel.
From a mathematician’s point of view, it is a simplification, but in an engi-
neering sense, it is more complicated; we add a third assumption.
iii) The transmission arrangement utilizes a channel interleaver (see Ref.
[23], Section 2.1) so as to make the fading coefficients hi of one codeword
i.i.d.
Mathematically, this means that the Rayleigh fast fading channel is described
by the equation (3.2) of block fading channels but with L = 1. The channel
quality is desribed by σ2h/σ2. We shall mainly consider the Rayleigh fast
fading channels in this thesis, but we point out already now that it can
be expected that lattice designs for Rayleigh fast fading channels can be
generalized to block fading channels, as we shall see in Section 3.3.3.
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3.3 Lattice codes and coset codes
3.3.1 Codes
In the previous subsections we concluded that the channel alphabet of all the
previously considered channel models can be regarded as points in Rm. The
next question is how to choose such points.
Recall that if Alice transmits x, Bob receives y given componentwise by
yi = |hi|xi + vi, and knows |hi| (hi = 1 for the AWGN channel). Hence,
Bob’s first task is to find the best guess for a signal point x, given y. Since
all models assume that the additive noise has a spherical symmetry, Bob’s
natural guess is the signal point xˆ such that diag(|hi|)xˆ is closest to y. Thus,
the signal vectors should allow efficient computational closest-point search.
A good choice is then to take the signalling points x to be a subset of a lattice.
As we shall see, also the faded vectors diag(|hi|)xˆ form a lattice then.
In coset coding, as motivated by information theory, one still transmits
points from the lattice Λb but decodes all representatives of a modulo class
Λb/Λe of a sublattice to the same input alphabet. Conversely, input is en-
coded in uniform random representatives. In practise, the signalling constel-
lation is a finite part of the lattice, so uniform distributions make sense.
Regarding lattice codes in wireless channels, one should yet point out the
power constraint. The conventional way to formulate a power constraint is
to choose the sending region to be a neighbourhood of the origin, typically
spherical or hypercubic.
3.3.2 On generalizing lattice code results from gaussian
to block fading channels
Since block fading channels are a generalization of gaussian channels, we will
typically want to generalize results considering gaussian channels to block
fading channels. Hence, let us vectorize the transmitted matrix X ∈ Rm×L
by stacking its column vectors to vec(X) ∈ RmL. Next, the noise is added
upon a faded message. Hence, we have to take into account the fading, in
which the vectorized information received by Bob or Eve becomes multiplied
by a block diagonal matrix in RmL×mL whose non-zero submatrices at the
diagonal block are diagonal matrices diag(|hi|), i.e.,
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vec(Y) =
 diag(|hi|) . . .
diag(|hi|)
 vec(X) + vec(V)
= diag(diag(|hi|), ..., diag(|hi|))vec(X) + vec(V).
The latter line is to be regarded as a definition for a notation.
Next, if the vectorized transmitted matrix vec(X) is given by lattice co-
ordinates u in the dense lattice Λb, i.e., vec(X) = Mu with M being the
generator matrix of Λb, then the received lattice point is given by
diag(diag(|hi|), ..., diag(|hi|))Mu = Mhu.
Hence, we can regard the received points as belonging to a “skewed” lattice
Λh,e generated by Mh. Similarly, the generator matrix MZ of the sparse
lattice Λe is skewed to MhZ. We emphasize that the derivation of this sub-
section, as well as the next one, does not assume a particular distribution for
the fading coefficients hi, but only that they are known to the receiver.
3.3.3 Geometry of lattices in fast and block fading chan-
nels
As another generalization procedure between channel models, we point out
a heuristic that allows us to generalize lattice designs from Rayleigh fast
fading channels to T -block fading channels. Consider code lattices ΛR and ΛB
(either in lattice or coset code purposes) in the respective channels, generated
by M and the block diagonal matrix diag(M, ...,M), respectively. Then,
the faded lattices ΛR,h and ΛB,h are generated by diag(|hi|)M and the block
diagonal matrix diag(diag(|hi|)M, ..., diag(|hi|)M). Hence, in particular, ΛB,h
consists of T orthogonal copies ΛR,h × ...× ΛR,h.
Next, by the previous subsection, a lattice ΛR in the Rayleigh fast fad-
ing channel is equivalent to the random lattice ΛR,h in the AWGN channel.
Typically, desings for the AWGN channel are highly geometric due to the
spherical symmetry. For example, the reliability of a lattice code boils down
to its sphere-pacing density. Now, if we know how to design ΛR, then ΛR,h
will (probabilistically, as hi’s are random) have a certain geometric behaviour,
for example a dense sphere packing. Then, it is often easy to make the lattice
ΛB,h = ΛR,h × ...× ΛR,h also satisfy the same geometric criteria.
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3.3.4 Probability bounds
Even though the fundamental results of information theory are almost all
based on the concepts of entropy and information, it is not always easy to
design codes based on these quantities. In the case of lattice coset codes,
it is conventional to only consider the legitimate receiver’s error probability
(REP) and the eavesdropper’s correct decision probability (ECDP). We give
here bounds for these probabilities. The bounds are proven and their tight-
ness is discussed in the appendices of this thesis, and the connection of the
ECDP and the eavesdropper’s information is discussed formally in [19] and
on an intuitive level in [16].
For Bob’s decoding error, we have the following upper bounds that are
asymptotically tight at good signal quality: for the AWGN channel
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
0 6=w∈Λb
e−‖w‖
2/8σ2b , (3.3)
and for the Rayleigh block fading channel
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
0 6=w∈Λb
m∏
i=1
1
1 + γb‖Wi‖2/4 , (3.4)
where γb = σ2h,b/σ2b depicts Bob’s channel quality, W is the matrix form of
w and [matrix]i denotes the ith row vector. As a special case of the above,
for the Rayleigh fast fading channel,
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
0 6=w∈Λb
m∏
i=1
1
1 + γbw2i /4
. (3.5)
For the ECDP, we have the following bounds that are asymptotically
tight at poor signal quality: for the AWGN channel,
Pc,e ≤
∑
t∈Λe
Vol(Λb)gn(t), (3.6)
where gn(w) = e−‖w‖
2/(2σ2e)/(2piσ2e)
n/2 is the standard n-dimensional spherical
zero-mean Gaussian density function with variance σ2e . For the Rayleigh
block fading channel,
Pc,e ≤ Γ(L/2 + 1)mVol(Λb)
(γe
pi
)Lm/2 ∑
vec(X)∈Λe
m∏
i=1
1
(1 + ‖Xi‖2γe)L/2+1 . (3.7)
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Here γe =
σ2h,e
σ2e
is again the channel quality, Γ is the standard gamma function
and Xi is the ith row of X. Again, as a special case of the above, for Rayleigh
fast fading channels we have
Pc,e ≤ Vol(Λb)
2m
γm/2e
∑
x∈Λe
m∏
i=1
1
(1 + x2i γe)
3/2
. (3.8)
Physical-layer design of reliablility and security would require minimizing
all the six objective functions above. However, lattice designs for Bob’s prob-
ability bounds (3.3) and (3.5) are known, and hence also at least moderately
good constructions for Eq. (3.4) of block fading channels follow by the gen-
eralization presented in Section 3.3.3. For Eve, we address minimizing the
bound (3.6) in [15], so the remaining main task of this thesis is to minimize
the bound (3.5). Again, block fading channels are then addressed via the
generalization of Section 3.3.3.
It should be pointed out that all these series are conventionally trun-
cated over the finite signalling region, although the ECDP bounds are not
completely rigorous if truncated. Physically, this truncation is equivalent to
neglecting the boundary effects of the finiteness of the constellation, which
should be legitimate for any interesting signal quality of the eavesdropper.
As a second remark, we point out how these bounds call our attention
to full-diversity lattices. The detailed computations are in appendix A.3.4.
Consider the objective of minimizing the REP (3.5). This minimization is
typically considered when the REP is on the order of 10−5–10−3, and hence,
it is relevant to only consider the limit γb → ∞. In this limit, it is obvious
that full-diversity lattices will perform best, since only then all terms of the
sum will decrease at a rate γ−mb . Then, having chosen a full-diversity lattice
Λb, the sublattice Λe will also necessarily be of full diversity, so both the
reliability and the security problem lead to the study of full-diversity lattices.
In addition, the 1’s in the denominator of (3.5) can be neglected in the limit
γb →∞ (see Eq. (A.8) in the Appendices), and the dominating term of the
series is determined by the minimum product distance of the lattice, which
we want to maximize in order to minimize the REP.
Finally, we point out that also sum (3.8) has traditionally been approx-
imated by dropping the ones in the denominator. This is called the inverse
norm sum (INS), since for algebraic lattices it becomes a sum of algebraic
norms (both definitions are given in the next section and the INS in Eq.
(5.1) later on). This has yielded some interesting number-theoretic prob-
lems, which were the starting point of this thesis. Nevertheless, the problem
with this approximation is that the bounds (3.7) and (3.8) are asymptotic
at poor signal quality γe → 0+, and dropping the ones is asymptotic at good
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signal quality γe → ∞. As mentioned in the introduction, our numerical
computations suggest that the tighter bounds given above do not seem to
correlate very well with this conventional approximation.
There is also a heuristic “engineer’s explanation” to why we should not
drop the ones in the denominators in Eq. (3.8). Namely, from the derivation
in Appendices A.2.1–A.2.2 we may notice that each term in the series (3.7)
and (3.8) depicts the probability that the vector xˆ to which Eve decodes x
satisfies xˆ− x = w. On the other hand, as described earlier, coset coding is
only useful when Eve’s detection resolution for the vectors x is approximately
the resolution of Λe. Hence, in particular, shifts of vectors w ∈ Λe should
occur with non-negligible probability. Consequently, we should not aim at
comparing the asymptotics or decay rates of expressions (3.7)–(3.8) at large
γe but instead cosider moderate values. An approximative formula for how
large a valuie of γe is “moderate” is given in Appendix B, and for unit-volume
lattices in low dimensions one will find approximately 0.5 ≤ γe ≤ 10. Short
vectors of unit-volume lattices will satisfy x2i  1 for some component i, and
hence for 0.5 ≤ γe ≤ 10 we cannot substitute (1 + x2i γe)3/2 ≈ (x2i γe)3/2. The
inverse norm sum is examined numerically in Section 5.
Chapter 4
Algebraic number theory
This section considers algebraic number theory from a purely mathematical
perspective. To give a hint of the link between this and the previous sections,
we give the following example, showing that all constructions of lattices of
diversity larger than one necessarily require considering field extensions of
Q.
Example 20. Let Λ ⊂ Rn be a lattice generated by M ∈ Qn×n. Then, Λ
intersects all the axes and is hence of diversity one. For let m be the jth
column vector of M−1. By Cramer’s rule, we have that M−1 ∈ Qn×n, so m
can be scaled to an integer vector ω = qm, q ∈ Z. Then, the lattice Λ point
Mω satisfies
(Mω)k = q
∑
l
Mk,lM
−1
l,j = qδk,j,
so Mω lies on the jth coordinate axis.
4.1 Algebraic structures and tools
In this subsection, we study finite algebraic field extensions. The main re-
sults concern their algebraic structure and substructures, e.g., the ring of
algebraic integers and the unit group as well as field extension invariants,
i.e., the discriminant and the regulator. None of the results in this section
are particularly difficult, but some proofs are only cited in order to save
space. The results are presented in an order that allows constructing the
theory along the lines of [29]. The reader is assumed to be familiar with
basic group, ring, and module theory as well as Galois theory applied to
number fields. Good references for these topics are, e.g., [28], [22], and [30].
25
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4.1.1 Algebraic numbers and integers
This subsection introduces the two main algebraic structures, i.e., the field
of algebraic numbers and the ring of algebraic integers.
Definition 21. The set of algebraic numbers A is the set of all roots of
polynomials over Q.
Theorem 22. A a field.
Definition 23. The set algebraic integers B is the set of all roots of monic
polynomials over Z.
Lemma 24. A complex number θ is in B if and only if the Z-module gener-
ated by its powers Z〈1, θ, θ2, ...〉 is finitely generated.
Theorem 25. Any root of a monic polynomial over B is in B.
Theorem 26. B is a ring.
Definition 27. Let K be a finite extension of Q. The intersection ring
K ∩ B := OK is called the ring of integers of K.
Notation 28. Here and in what follows we will encounter notations with
subscripts K that emphasize that a field extension K : Q is considered. If
there is no danger of confusion, these subscrips might be dropped.
Lemma 29. For any α ∈ K, there exists a nonzero c ∈ Z s.t. cα ∈ OK.
Corollary 30. K has a Q-basis consisting of algebraic integers.
4.1.2 Discriminants, field polynomials, norms, and traces
In this subsection, we will give the definitions and the basic properties of
discriminants, norms, and traces, which are standard tools in considerations
of given algebraic extensions.
However, we start with a lemma and a theorem that will later on make
several proofs essentially easier.
Lemma 31. Let K : Q be a finite extension. Then, there exists θ ∈ K such
that K = Q(θ).
Theorem 32. Let K = Q(θ) be algebraic with [K : Q] = n. Then, there
are exactly n monomorphisms σi : K → C. These monomorphisms satisfy
σi|Q = id and they can hence be written as σi : θ 7→ θi, where θi is some root
of the minimal polynomial of θ.
CHAPTER 4. ALGEBRAIC NUMBER THEORY 27
Remark 33. From the identity σi|Q = id and the homomorphism property
we have directly that a root in K of any p(t) ∈ Q[t] is mapped to some
K-root of p by σi. In particular, σi maps OK to algebraic integers.
Definition 34. The discriminant ∆(α1, ..., αn) of a Q-basis {α1, ..., αn} of
an extension K : Q is defined as
∆(α1, ..., αn) = (det Σ)
2, where Σij = σj(αi). (4.1)
Lemma 35. If the basis {α1, ..., αn} of K over Q is expressed by another
basis {β1, ..., βn} as α1...
αn
 = M
 β1...
βn
 , where M ∈ Qn×n, (4.2)
then the discriminants are related by
∆(α1, ..., αn) = |M|2∆(β1, ..., βn). (4.3)
Lemma 36. The discriminant of any basis is rational and non-zero.
Definition 37. The field polynomial fα(t) of α ∈ K is defined as
fα(t) =
n∏
i=1
(t− σi(α)). (4.4)
Lemma 38. The field polynomial fα(t) is a power of the minimal polynomial
of α.
Definition 39. The norm NK(α) and trace TK(α) of α ∈ K are defined as
NK(α) =
n∏
i=1
σi(α) and TK(α) =
n∑
i=1
σi(α).
Lemma 40. The norm is multiplicative, NK(α1α2) = NK(α1)NK(α2), and
the trace is Q-linear, TK(a1α1 +a2α2) = a1TK(α1)+a2TK(α2) for all a1, a2 ∈
Q.
Lemma 41. If α ∈ OK, then NK(α), TK(α) ∈ Z.
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4.1.3 The ring of integers
In this section, we consider the algebraic structure that is of the utmost
interest in this work, namely the ring of integers of a finite algebraic field
extension. We prove that the ring of integers of any finite extension K : Q
is a free abelian group. Furthermore, we give the definition of our first field
invariant, the discriminant, and develop a machinery which will allow us to
find a Z-basis for this group.
Theorem 42. Assume [K : Q] = n < ∞. Then OK is a free abelian group
of rank n.
Corollary 43. Any Z-basis of OK is a Q-basis of K.
Proof. Firstly, by the free abelian property, the elements of the Z-basis are
linearly independent over Z and hence over Q. Secondly, by Lemma 29, any
α ∈ K can be expressed as a Q-linear combination of a Z-basis of OK .
Combining Theorem 42 with what we already know about discriminants,
we can obtain some useful information.
Corollary 44. The discriminant of a Z-basis of OK does not depend on the
choice of basis.
Proof. The change-of-basis matrices between any two Z-bases of a free abelian
group are integer matrices with determinant one. Hence, by the discriminant
relation in Lemma 35, the discriminants of any two Z-bases are equal.
Due this corollary, we define the following
Definition 45. The discriminant ∆K of a finite extension K : Q is the
discriminant of any Z-basis of OK .
Lemma 46. For any finite extension K : Q, ∆K ∈ Z \ {0}.
Knowing quite a lot about the ring of integers OK , the next step is to
show that it can be found explicitly.
Algorithm 47. There is an algorithm with the following properties. The
algorithm is given any basis of K consisting of elements in OK and the
monomorphisms σi : K → C. In a finite number of steps, the algorithm
will find a Z-basis of OK.
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4.1.4 Dirichlet Unit Theorem and the regulator
In this subsection, we study the multiplicative unit group (O∗K , ·, 1) of OK .
The algebraic structure of this group is determined by the Dirichlet Unit
Theorem, and the density of the units is measured by the regulator, our
second field extension invariant.
Theorem 48 (Dirichlet Unit Theorem). Let K : Q be a finite algebraic ex-
tension with s real monomorphisms K → R and 2t truly complex1 monomor-
phisms K → C. Then, the multiplicative unit group (O∗K , ·, 1) of OK has
s + t − 1 fundamental units ηj such that any x ∈ O∗K can be expressed as
x = ζηr11 ...η
rs+t−1
s+t−1 , where ζ ∈ O∗K is some complex root of unity and the
exponents rj are unique.
Remark 49. The roots of unity are the torsion subgroup T of O∗K , so a
group-theoretical formulation of the theorem would be that the quotient
group (O∗K/T, ·, 1) is free abelian of rank (s+ t− 1).
Remark 50. The Dirichlet unit theorem only tells the number of the fun-
damental units. Finding them is another non-trivial task.
Definition 51. The logarithmic embedding matrix A ∈ R(s+t)×(s+t−1)of Dirich-
let units η1, ..., ηs+t−1 is given elementwise by
Aij = di log |σi(ηj)|, (4.5)
where di = 1 if σi is a real monomorphism and di = 2 otherwise. The
embeddings σi are labelled so that there are no conjugate pairs in 1 ≤ i ≤
s+ t.
Lemma 52. The value of | det Ai0| for a submatrix Ai0 ∈ R(s+t−1)×(s+t−1)
obtained by deleting the ith0 row of A does not depend on the choice of i0,
neither on the system of fundamental units or the choice of indexing of the
embeddings and the fundamental units.
Proof sketch. The norm of a unit is plus or minus one, so
s+t∑
i=0
di log |σi(ηj)| = log(|NK(ηj)|) = 0. (4.6)
Hence, all the columns of A, considered as vectors in Rs+t, lie on the zero-
mean hyperplane H := {x ∈ Rs+t|∑s+ti=0 xi = 0}. Geometrically, deleting
1Note that the truly complex monomorphisms exist in conjugate pairs, so they must
be even in number.
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the ith0 row of A and corresponds to orthogonally projecting the column
vectors to the subspace xi0 = 0 in Rs+t. Consider the (s + t)-dimensional
volume V of the parallellotope in Rs+t spanned by the column vectors of A
and ei0 . Then, V = | det Ai0| =[(s + t − 1)-dimensional volume of the unit
parallellotope spanned by the column vectors in H]cos(∠(H, ei0)). The plane
H is symmetric with respect to the axes, so cos(∠(H, ei0)) is independent of
i0
This lemma ensures that the following definition is not ambiguous in the
sense that it would depend on our indexing i of monomorphisms σi and
logarithmic embeddings li.
Definition 53. The regulator RK of a finite algebraic extension K : Q is
defined as | det A1|.
Remark 54. As calculated in the proof of Lemma 52, RK = is proportional
to the (s + t − 1)-dimensional volume of the unit parallellotope spanned by
the column vectors of A in H. Hence, the regulator measures the density of
the additive abelian group lattice generated by the fundamental units in the
logarithmic space.
The above interpretation is quantized by the following theorem [8]. We
point out that contrary to all other omitted proofs in this section, the proof
of this theorem is not easy unless we skip the term (cR2/rK )
−1 in the exponent.
Theorem 55. Let K be a degree n extension of Q with s real and 2t (non-
real) complex embeddings σi : K → C, and let r := s + t − 1 ≥ 2. Then, as
q →∞,
#{x ∈ O×K : max
1≤i≤n
|σi(x)| < q}
=
w(r + 1)
RKr!
(log q)r +O(log q)r−1−(cR2/rK )−1 ,
where w is the number of roots of unity in K, RK is the regulator and c =
6 · 2 · 1012n10(1 + 2 log n) is a constant depending only on the degree of the
extension K/Q.
4.2 Ideals and factorizations
In this chapter, we consider the problem of factorizing elements of the ring
of integers OK of a finite algebraic extension K : Q. This problem became
relevant in solving diophantine equations (or, actually, often in proving the
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non-existence of a solution) and, in particular, in attempting to prove the
famous Fermat’s last theorem. However, in our case, it will have its motiva-
tion in bounding the number of elements in OK of a given norm. It will turn
out, that a unique factorization into irreducibles is not always possible, but
it is always possible to factorize ideals.
As in the previous sections, many proofs are only cited.
4.2.1 Introduction: non-unique factorization in the ring
of integers
Definition 56. Consider a field extensionK : Q. Then, a ∈ OK is irreducible
if all its factorizations a = bc, where b, c ∈ OK , satisfy b ∈ O∗K or c ∈ O∗K .
The element a is prime if ab = cd, where b, c, d ∈ OK implies ab′ = c or
ab′ = d, with some b′ ∈ OK .
It can be shown that a prime element is always irreducible, but the con-
verse does not hold. Another important difference between the two concepts
is that a prime factorization is unique, whereas a factorization into irre-
ducibles is not. Both of these properties are illustrated by the following
example.
Example 57. Consider K = Q(
√−5), with OK = Z[
√−5], and the fac-
torization of 6 ∈ OK . Now, it is easy to come up with two alternative
factorizations
6 = (1−√−5)(1 +√−5) = 2 · 3.
We are going to show that both these factorizations are irreducible and hence,
the factorization into irreducibles is not unique. Furthermore, we show that
the irreducible element (1 +
√−5) is not prime.
The norm in K given by
N(a+ b
√−5) = a2 + 5b2.
Hence, the norms of the respective factors above are 6, 6, 4, and 9. Recall that
the norm is multiplicative by Lemma 40 and integral by Lemma 41. Now,
assume that any of the factors in the two factorizations has a factorization,
e.g., 2 = (a + b
√−5)(c + d√−5), where a, b, c, d ∈ N. It is easy to show
that the integers 6, 6, 4, and 9 have no nontrivial factors of the form N(a +
b
√−5) = a2 + 5b2, where a, b ∈ N. Hence, we must have N(c+ d√−5) = 1,
equivalently, (c+ d
√−5) is a unit. Then, by definition, the factors above are
irreducible.
For irreducible elements not being necessarily prime, consider again the
above two factorizations. If (1 +
√−5) was prime, then we shold have 2 =
CHAPTER 4. ALGEBRAIC NUMBER THEORY 32
x(1 +
√−5) or 3 = x(1 + √−5) with some x ∈ OK . But, using norm
multiplicativity, this would require 4 = 6N(x) or 9 = 6N(x), both impossible
for x ∈ OK .
As a conclusion, a general ring of integers OK does not exhibit the pleas-
ant properties of Z = OQ, where all irreducibles are primes and, equivalently,
all factorizations into irreducibles are unique up to order and units. Rings of
integers or more generally any domains with this Z-like property are called
unique factorization domains (UFDs). Furthermore, by now we have no good
tools for finding a factorization into irreducibles or even proving that a given
factorization is irreducible. Working with norms as in the example above will
in general lead to diophantine equations that might be very difficult to solve.
It will turn out that to proceed to at least partially answer these questions,
the theory of ideals will be useful.
4.2.2 General theory: ideal products, fractional and
prime ideals
This subsection considers a more general theory, which will later on be ap-
plied to algebraic number fields. The aim of this section is to develop the
theory of ideal products and prove that in an algebraic structure called a
Dedekind domain, a generalization of rings of integers, ideal products ex-
hibit the unique factorization property not generally present in the rings of
integers, hence motivating the concept of prime ideals.
We point out that the concept of Dedekind domains and the theorem on
the existence of unique prime-ideal factorization are in a way superfluous.
This in the sense that the existence of a unique prime-ideal factorization in
rings of integers will also follow from the theorem and algorithm given later
that will find the prime-ideal decomposition. The abstract approach is still
given for mainly two reasons. First, the explicit construction of the prime-
ideal decomposition takes some ten pages, and it would be strange to work on
such a lengthy construction if there were no guarantee of the results actually
existing. Second, the theorem and definition are given in an abstract setting
and they answer to the question why a unique prime-ideal decomposition
exists in rings of integers, and in what other algebraic structures prime-ideal
decompositions will exist.
We start with some general theory of rings and ideals.
Definition 58. The product ideal ab of two ideals a and b of a commutative
ring is defined as
ab = 〈{ab|a ∈ a, b ∈ b}〉
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Remark 59. If generator-representations a = 〈∪i∈Iai〉 and b = 〈∪j∈Jbj〉 are
at hand, then the product ideal can be expressed as ab = 〈∪i∈I,j∈Jaibj〉, and
its elements are of the form a1b1 + ...+ anbn.
Definition 60. A prime ideal a has the property bc ⊆ a⇒ b ⊆ a or c ⊆ a.
Theorem 61. Let a be an ideal of a commutative ring R. Then,
i) a is maximal if and only if R/a is a field.
ii) a is prime if and only if R/a is an integral domain.
Proof. The proof is given in [29, Lemma 5.1], or in [22].
The importance of the preceding theorem is that it is typically easier to
examine the algebraic structures of the quotients that the ideals themselves.
As an example, it yields directly the following sufficient and easy-to-check
condition for an ideal to be prime, which would not be as easy to establish
directly from the definition of a prime ideal.
Corollary 62. A maximal ideal of a commutative ring is prime.
Definition 63. A ring R is noetherian if every ideal of R is finitely generated.
Lemma 64. The following are equivalent for a ring R:
i) R is noetherian
ii) all ascending chains of strict ideal inclusions I1 ( I2 ( ... are finitely
long
iii) all families of ideals have a maximal element w.r.t. the inclusion rela-
tion.
Proof. The direction (iii) ⇒ (ii) is easy. The converse (ii) ⇒ (iii) follows by
applying Zorn’s lemma on a family of ideals. Hence, we have to prove (i) ⇔
(ii).
For (ii) ⇒ (i), assume the ascending chain condition. Then, let I be
any ideal and xi ∈ I a set of elements defined inductively such that xi 6∈
〈x1, ..., xi−1〉. Then, by the ascending chain condition, the ascending chain
〈x1〉 ( 〈x1, x2〉 ( ... cannot be continued infinitely. Hence, there exists n
such that I \ 〈x1, ...xn〉 = ∅, proving that I is finitely generated.
For (i) ⇒ (ii), assume that the ring is noetherian and take an ascending
chain I1 ( I2 ( .... Then, by the basic ideal test, the union of these ascending
ideals is an ideal, hence finitely generated, ∪i≥1Ii = 〈x1, ..., xm〉. But then,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ m there exist j(k) such that xj ∈ Ij(k) and thus the chain must
end at max1≤k≤m j(k).
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Theorem 65. In a noetherian commutative ring, every element has a fac-
torization into irreducibles.
Proof sketch. If an element x could be iteratively factorized into non-units
infinitely many times as x = x1y1 = x1x2y2 = ..., then this would provide an
infinite ascending chain of ideals 〈x〉 ( 〈y1〉 ( 〈y2〉 ( ...
For the remainder of this subsection, we consider the special case of rings
called Dedekind domains. We point out the following notations.
Notation 66. Throughout this subsection, we assume O to be a Dedekind
domain and K its field of fractions. Ideals are denoted with gothic lower-case
letters such as a, b, c. The letter p is reserved for prime ideals. Fractional ide-
als are denoted by capital gothic such as A, B, C (except O). Multiplication
of a set and an element is defined as ca = ∪a∈aca.
Definition 67. An integral domain O with the field of fractions K is a
Dedekind domain if it satisfies all the following conditions:
i) noetherianity
ii) if α ∈ K is a root of a monic polynomial p(t) ∈ K[t]∩O[t], then α ∈ O
iii) every non-zero prime ideal of O is maximal.
Remark 68. Together with Theorem 65, condition (i) implies that a factor-
ization into irreducibles exists in Dedekind domains and hence, as we shall
soon see, in rings of integers.
Condition (iii) above is the converse of the general result in Corollary
62, so it could also be stated and is typically used in the form “in Dedekind
domains, maximality and primality of a non-trivial ideal are equivalent”.
The following theorem gaurantees that Dedekind domains are of interest
in algebraic number theory.
Theorem 69. Let K : Q be a finite extension. Then, OK is a Dedekind
domain.
We give the proof here. The proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 70. Assume [K : Q] = n. Then, all non-zero ideals I of OK are
free additive abelian groups of rank n.
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Proof. OK is a free abelian group by Lemma 42, and a subgroup of a free
abelian is always free abelian. The rank is since if 0 6= x ∈ I, then the ideal
〈x〉 = xOK is an additive subgroup of I. But if {ωi}ni=1 is an integer basis
of OK , then {xωi}ni=1 is easily proven to be a Z-basis of xOK . Hence, I has
the subgroup xOK which is of maximal rank in OK and is thus itself also a
maximal-rank subgroup of OK .
Proof of Theorem 69. Condition (i) follows directly from Lemma 70, since
any ideal is generated by its n-element Z-basis.
Condition (ii) is a re-statement of Lemma 25.
Condition (iii): let I be a non-zero prime ideal of OK , hence of maximal
rank by Lemma 70. By basic theory of free abelian groups (see, e.g., [29,
Theorem 1.7]), the qoutient rings of maximal-rank ideals such as OK/I is
finite. On the other hand, by Theorem 61 (i), OK/I is a domain. But all
finite domains are fields, so by Theorem 61 (ii), I is maximal.
Definition 71. An O-submodule A of K is a fractional ideal, if there exists
0 6= c ∈ O such that cA ⊆ O.
Remark 72. A useful equivalent formulation of the definition is that A ⊆ K
is a fractional ideal if and only if A = c−1b for some ideal b of O and c ∈ O.
Then, A′ ⊆ A implies A′ = c−1b′ where b′ ⊆ b.
Definition 73. The product of two fractional ideals A = c−1b and A′ = c′−1b′
is defined using the product of ideals as
AA′ = (cc′)−1bb′.
The following lemma is very easy, but it will be used repeatedly, which is
why we point it out in the beginning.
Lemma 74. A fractional ideal of K is an ideal of O if and only if it is
contained in O.
Proof. ’Only if’ is obvious. ’If’ is since the set A = c−1b is an additive group
because b is one, and for any x ∈ OK , we have xA = c−1xb ⊆ c−1b = A.
The following theorem is the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 75. Let O be a Dedekind domain and d an ideal of O. Then, there
exists a decomposition of d into a product of finitely many prime ideals. This
decomposition is unique up to order.
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Proof. For the ease of reading, the proof is given in steps. The general idea
is to define the inverse of an ideal and show that for prime ideals, pp−1 =
O. Then, one proves the existence of a prime-ideal decomposition of d by
counter-assumption and the use of the maximal and prime ideal d ⊂ p. These
are done in steps (i), (v), and (vi), respectively, with steps (ii)–(iv) containing
lemmas and (vi) proving the uniqueness of the prime-ideal decomposition.
i) Define an inverse of an ideal a ⊆ O as a−1 = {x ∈ K|xa ⊆ O} ⊆ K.
Then, if a ⊆ b, we have b−1 ⊆ a−1. Furthermore, a−1 is a fractional
ideal, and so is a−1b for any ideal b of O
The first property follows directly from the definition. The second one follows
since a−1 is easily proven to be an O-submodule of K and, taking any a ∈ a,
we have aa−1 ⊆ O. The third part is identical to the second one.
ii) If a 6= O, we have a strict inclusion O ( a−1.
Before proving this, we need the following lemma.
iii) Given any non-trivial ideal a, there exist finitely many prime ideals
p1, ..., pr such that p1...pr ⊆ a
If a is prime, we are done. Otherwise, assume on the contrary that for
some non-prime ideals ai there does not exist such prime ideals. Since the
ring O is noetherian, using Lemma 64 (iii), we can take take a maximal ideal
a amongst such ideals ai. By the non-primality, there exist b and c such that
bc ⊆ a, b 6⊆ a, c 6⊆ a. Then, it follows that the ideal (a+b)(a+c) is contained
in a, which is in turn strictly contained in both (a + b) and (a + c). By the
maximality of a, the latter two contain some prime-ideal products,
p1...ps ⊆ (a+ b)
ps+1...pr ⊆ (a+ c),
but this would imply
⇒ p1...pr ⊆ (a+ b)(a+ c) ⊆ a,
a contradiction.
We now return to the proof of part (ii).
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Recall that primality and maximality of an ideal are equivalent in Dedekind
domains. Hence, a ⊆ p for some prime ideal p and thus by part (i), p−1 ⊆ a−1.
Hence, it suffices to prove that we have a strict inclusion O ⊂ p−1.
Now, take a ∈ p and hence 〈a〉 ⊆ p. By part (ii), we have prime ideals
p1...pr ⊆ 〈a〉 ⊆ p.
But then, using inductively the primality of p, we can assume p1 ⊆ p, and
hence by maximality of p1, we have p1 = p. If we now choose r to be the
smallest possible amount of ideals such that
p1...pr ⊆ 〈a〉,
then it follows that
p2...pr 6⊆ 〈a〉.
(If r = 1, then use O 6⊆ 〈a〉.) Now choose any b ∈ p2...pr \ 〈a〉, so a−1b 6∈ O.
Then, a−1bp ⊆ a−1p1...pr = a−1〈a〉 = O, and hence by definition a−1b ∈
p−1 \O. This completes the proof of part (ii).
iv) Assume that θ ∈ K satisfies θa ⊆ a for some non-zero ideal a of O.
Then, θ ∈ O.
By noetherianity, a = 〈a1, ..., am〉. Then, since θa ⊆ a, there is a matrix
A ∈ am×m ⊂ Km×m such that a1θ...
amθ
 = A
 a1...
am
 .
But since the vector (a1, ..., am) is non-zero, considering this as linear algebra
of the field K implies that
det(A− θ) = 0.
This charachteristic equation is monic with coefficients inO, and hence θ ∈ O
by the axoim (ii) of Dedekind domains.
v) For a prime ideal p, pp−1 = O.
The product pp−1 is by part (i) a fractional ideal and by definition contained
in O. Then, it is an ideal by Lemma 74. Since 1 ∈ p−1, we have the chain of
ideals
p ⊆ pp−1 ⊆ O,
and by the maximality of p, one equality holds. But if it was the first one,
then by part (iv) we had p−1 ⊆ O, contradicting part (ii), so we must have
pp−1 = O
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vi) All ideals d can be written as a product of prime ideals.
Assume that this was not true, and, using noetherianity, take a maximal
ideal d amongst those contradicting the existence of prime-ideal decomposi-
tion. We now construct a suitable ideal stricly larger that d. First, we find
the ideal by starting from d ( p for some maximal and hence prime p (which
is a prime-ideal decomposition itself and hence not d). Using part (i),
dp−1 ⊆ dd−1 ⊆ O,
where the latter inclusion is directly from the definition of d−1. But using
part (i) again, dp−1 is a fractional ideal and by the above contained in O,
hence an ideal by Lemma 74.
Next, we prove the strict inclusion d ( dp−1. By part (ii), there exists an
element θ ∈ p−1 \ O. Applying part (iv) on this element, we have θd 6⊆ d,
so dp−1 6⊆ d. Since on the other hand 1 ∈ p−1, it follows that d ⊆ dp−1 and
finally d ( dp−1.
Now that we have constructed the larger ideal dp−1, we use the counter-
assumption. By the maximality of d, the ideal dp−1 has a prime-ideal de-
composition,
dp−1 = p1...pr.
Multiplying by p and using part (v),
dp−1p = dO = d = p1...prp,
a contradiction. Hence, any ideal d of O indeed possesses a prime-ideal
decomposition.
We now have the existence of a prime-ideal decomposition. For the
uniqueness, we need the following highly useful lemma, which is labelled
separately for later reference.
Lemma 76. Ideal inclusion b ⊆ a and factorization b = ac, denoted a|b, are
equivalent.
Proof. The direction b = ac⇒ b ⊆ a is immediate from the definition of an
ideal.
The converse direction is proved by considering the fractional ideal ba−1 ⊆
aa−1 ⊆ O, which is an ideal by Lemma 74. Then, taking c = ba−1 yields
immediately b = ac
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Remark 77. Lemma 76 means that in Dedekind domains, the definition
of a prime ideal can be equivalently formulated as “p is prime if it has the
property that p|ab ⇒ p|a or p|b”. This is what one would intuitively call
primality.
We now return to the final part of Theorem 75.
vii) The prime-ideal decomposition is unique up to order.
By the product definition of prime ideals in Remark 77, each prime ideal
must appear in both decompositions.
We point out that it could be proven that the inverse ideal a−1 as defined
above satisfies aa−1 = O also for non-prime ideals a [see [29], Proof 5.5 (vi)].
However, from the existence of prime-ideal decomposition and inverses of
prime ideals, we have the following result.
Theorem 78. The set F of fractional ideals is an abelian group (F , ·,OK).
Also the following lemma is useful and easy to prove using Lemma 76.
Corollary 79. The smallest ideal in the sense of inclusions (equivalently ,
the one having the most prime-ideal factors) of all ideals dividing the two
ideals a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b) and given by a+b. The largest ideal in
the sense of inclusions (the one having the least prime-ideal factors) divisible
by the ideals a, b is denoted lcm(a, b) and is given by a ∩ b.
This corollary implies immediately the following theorem, which is not
important in this work, but a classic of algebraic number theory.
Theorem 80 (Chinese remainder theorem). Let a and b be two coprime
ideals of O. Then, for every x ∈ O there exists b ∈ b such that x ≡ b mod a.
Furthermore, the set of solutions b ∈ b are the ab-translates of one solution.
Proof. By the corollary above, we have O = gcd(a, b) = a+b since the ideals
are coprime. But O = a+ b is a re-statement of the first part. Similarly, the
second part follows from ab = lcm(a, b) = a ∩ b.
We yet return to rings of integers and consider very briefly the concept
of an ideal norm.
Definition 81. The norm of a non-zero ideal a of OK is defined as N(a) =
|OK/a|.
Remark 82. By Lemma 70 and the basic theory of free abelian groups, the
ideal norm is always finite.
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Lemma 83. The norm of an ideal is multiplicative, i.e., N(ab) = N(a)N(b).
Proof. This is given in [29, Theorem 5.12].
Corollary 84. An ideal a with N(a) ∈ P is prime.
Lemma 85. The ideal norm of a principal ideal in OK is the element norm
of its generator, N(〈x〉) = |NK(x)|.
Proof. This is given in [29, Corollary 5.10].
4.2.3 The Dedekind zeta function
We return to algebraic number fields. As a model problem related to the
problems we study the Dedekind zeta function. For the final purposes of this
thesis work, the zeta function will have no other use than simply motivating
the study of ideal norms and prime ideals at this point. However, in a larger
perspective, the functions has relevance from the point of view of the very
same communication problem. It has even been suggested (cf. [11]), that the
Dedekind zeta function could be used for optimizing the ECDP in algebraic
lattices. However, the Dedekind zeta function seems not to serve as a very
good estimate for the ECDP. Very recently, some more elaborate but related
estimates based on the related ideal class zeta function have been established
[13].
Definition 86. The Dedekind zeta function ζK of a finite algebraic field
extension K : Q is defined as
ζK(s) =
∑
a
1
N(a)s
,
where the summation goes over all ideals.
The following lemmas will first show the connection of the Dedekind zeta
function to the prime ideals considered in the preceding chapter and to the
ideals pOK generated by rational primes p, which will be considered in the
next chapter. Together, these lemmas will also allow proving the convergence
of the zeta function.
Lemma 87. The Dedekind zeta function has an Euler product representa-
tion. The convergence of these two representations is equivalent and they are
given as
ζK(s) =
∏
p
(
1− 1
N(p)s
)−1
,
where the product goes over all prime ideals.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to proving the Euler product form of the Rie-
mann zeta function. For details, we refer to, e.g., [21].
We state and prove the following lemma first in a general setting since it
is a more general property.
Lemma 88. Let OK be a commutative ring and p its prime ideal with
[OK/p] <∞. Then,
i) there is exactly one prime p such that 〈p〉 ⊆ p,
ii) The norm of the ideal is a power this prime, [OK/p] = pk,
iii) If OK is a free abelian group of rank n, then k ≤ n.
Proof. i) By Theorem 61, OK/p is a domain, and a finite domain is a field.
Now, given q ∈ P, 〈q〉 ⊆ p would imply that every element of OK/p would
have an additive order dividing q. But the additive order of every non-zero
element is the characteristic of the field, hence a prime p.
ii)By Cauchy’s theorem for abelian groups, if [OK/p] had any prime factor
q other than p, then inOK/p there would exist an element with additive order
q, contradicting well-definedness of the characteristic p.
iii) p/pOK is an additive subgroup of OK/pOK , which has the order pn
in rank n free abelian groups OK . Hence, by Lagrange’s theorem, we have
k ≤ n.
Using Lemmas 42 and 76, the preceding Lemma is easily seen to take the
following form.
Lemma 89. Let K : Q be an algebraic extension of degree n and p a prime
ideal of OK. Then, the ideal norm N(p) is a power of a rational prime pk,
1 ≤ k ≤ n. Furthermore, p is the only rational prime such that p|〈p〉.
This seemingly innocent lemma has remarkable implications.
Corollary 90. For ideals of OK with [K : Q] = n, the following hold:
i) The prime ideals form equivalence classes according to which rational-
prime generated ideals they divide. In each such equivalence class, as-
sume pi with the norm N(pi) = pfi factors 〈p〉 =
∏g
i=1 p
ei
i with multi-
plicity ei. Then,
∑g
i=1 fiei = n.
ii) The prime ideals of OK are countably infinite in number.
As a continuation to part (i) of Cor. 90, we make the following termino-
logical definition.
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Definition 91. Consider the prime-ideal factorization of a rational-prime
generated ideal 〈p〉 of OK with [K : Q] = n. We say that the rational prime
p
i) ramifies, if some of the prime ideals dividing it has multiplicity larger
than one,
ii) ramifies totally, if it is an nth power of a rational-prime normed prime
ideal, 〈p〉 = pn with N(p) = p,
iii) splits, if it has at least two distinct prime-ideal factors,
iv) splits totally, if it is a product of n distinct rational-prime normed prime
ideals, 〈p〉 = ∏ni=1 pi with N(pi) = p,
v) is inert, if 〈p〉 is a prime ideal itself.
With the previously introduced results, the following result becomes easy.
Corollary 92. The Dedekind zeta series converges for <s > 1.
Proof. For any complex series, absolute convergence implies convergence.
Hence, note that the absolute-value series, can be expressed as∑
a
∣∣∣∣ 1N(a)s
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
a
1
N(a)<s
= ζK(<s).
This means that actually convergence for real s > 1 implies convergence for
all complex s with <s > 1 .
Consider now the contribution to the Euler representation by prime ideals
whose norm is a power of a fixed rational prime p. Using the notation of part
(i) of Corollary 90, this is given by∏
N(p)|p
(
1− 1
N(p)s
)−1
=
g∏
i=1
(
1− 1
pfis
)−1
.
Here 1 ≤ g ≤ n and 1 ≤ fi ≤ n. Hence, we can give an upper bound by
taking a maximal number of maximal factors all larger than one, given by∣∣∣∣∣
g∏
i=1
(
1− 1
pfis
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
1−max
i
∣∣∣∣ 1psfi
∣∣∣∣)−n
≤
(
1− 1
ps(mini fi)
)−n
=
(
1− 1
ps
)−n
.
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By Cor. 90, part (i) the Euler representation can be upper bounded by taking
into account this upper bound for all p ∈ P. This gives
|ζK(s)| =
∏
p∈P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
N(p)|p
(
1− 1
N(p)s
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∏
p∈P
(
1− 1
ps
)−n
= ζ(s)n,
where ζ is the ordinary Riemann zeta function, whose Euler product was
used in the last step. Since the Riemann zeta function converges for <s > 1,
as is easily proven using the harmonic series, this proves the claim.
From the proof of the preceding corollary we extract the following defini-
tion which is useful in numerical evaluations of the Dedekind zeta function.
Definition 93. The local Euler factor Lp,K of the Dedekind zeta function
for an extension K : Q at prime p is the function C→ C
Lp,K(s) :=
∏
N(p)|p
(
1− 1
N(p)s
)−1
,
so that whenever the zeta function converges, it has the convergent product
representation
ζK(s) =
∏
p∈P
Lp,K(s).
4.3 Finding the prime ideals explicitly
In this section, we give a theorem and an algorithm sufficient to yield all
prime ideals of a ring of integers, based on the prime-ideal decomposition
of a rational-prime generated ideal pOK of OK . The theorem given in the
first subsection applies for all but finitely many p and gives the generators of
pOK . For the remaining cases, the algorithm given in the second subsection
will construct a basis of pOK computationally efficiently.
4.3.1 Almost all cases: Dedekind’s theorem
After obtaining some knowledge on the convergence of the Dedekind zeta
function, the step towards any numerical evaluations is to find the prime
CHAPTER 4. ALGEBRAIC NUMBER THEORY 44
ideals of any equivalence class of Cor. 90, part (i). The next theorem is
also due to Dedekind, and given a finite field extension K : Q, it yields the
prime-ideal decomposition of any rational-prime generated ideal for all but
pinitely many rational primes p.
Theorem 94 (Dedekind). Let K = Q(θ) be an algebraic extension with
θ ∈ B and p a prime not dividing2 [OK : Z[θ]]. Consider the prime-ideal
factorization 〈p〉 = ∏gi=1 peii of 〈p〉 with N(pi) = pfi. Denoting the minimal
polynomial of θ by m(t) ∈ Z[t] and its decomposition into distinct irreducible
factors in Zp[t] as m(t) ≡
∏gp
i=1 pii(t)
i. Then, with a suitable indexing of the
ideals pi the following hold.
i) The number of prime factors pii(t) equals that of the prime factors pi,
i.e., g = gp.
ii) The exponents fi are given by fi = ∂pii(t).
iii) The multiplicity of a prime-ideal factor equals that of an irreducible
polynomial factor, i.e., ei = i.
iv) The generator-representation of the prime ideals in this indexing is
pi = 〈Πi(θ), p〉, where Πi(t) ∈ Z[t] is any polynomial such that Πi(t) ≡
pii(t)(mod p)
Along with the statement of this theorem, some remarks on the assump-
tions and applicability tests are useful.
Remark 95. By the lemmas 31 and 29, the statenent K = Q(θ), θ ∈ B is
not an assumption but simply a notational matter whenever [K : Q] < ∞.
Similarly, theorems 75 and 69 guarantee that the ideal 〈p〉 has a unique
prime-ideal factorization. Contrast to these, the assumption that p does not
divide [OK : Z[θ]] does provide a real restriction. Our subsequent efforts will
be on trying to circumvent this problem. Later in this subsection, we will
provide both sufficient and equivalent conditions for this to hold. Interest-
ingly, neither one of these requires knowledge of OK (which is cumbersome to
calculate by hand). In the next subsection, we will prove a general algorithm
for finding the prime-ideal generators.
Next, we are about to prove Theorem 94. Before the actual proof we
yet state the necessary ring isomorphism theorem for the convenience of the
reader.
2This ought to be considered as a quotient of additive groups; Z[θ] is not an ideal but
a subring.
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Theorem 96 (Third Isomorphism Theorem of rings). Let R be a ring and
I and J its two-sided ideals with I ⊆ J . Then,
R/I
/
J/I ∼= R/J
and the isomorphism map R/I
/
J/I → R/J is given explicitly by (r + I) +
J/I 7→ r + J .
Proof of Theorem 94. We will split the proof into steps for the ease od read-
ing. Throughout the proof, denote l = [OK : Z[θ]] and reduction modulo p
by an overbar. Pricipal ideals of a ring R generated by r ∈ R are denoted rR
instead of 〈r〉 as usually in this text, since we will work with several different
rings.
Before starting the steps, we will modify the statement of the thorem.
Note that pi factors, equivalently contains pOK and is prime, equivalently
maximal. Hence using Theorem 61 (i),
pi is a maximal ideal of OK ⇔ OK/pi is a field
(Third Isomorphism Theorem) ∼= OK/pOK
/
pi/pOK , hence also a field
⇔ pi/pOK is a maximal ideal of OK/pOK .
Hence, our objects of interest are the maximal ideals of OK/pOK . This and
analogous calculations are in continuation called the canonical and maximality-
preserving one-to-one correspondence between the ideals J/I of R/I and the
ideals J of R containing I.
i) We have an isomorphism Z[θ]/pZ[θ] ∼= OK/pOK.
For an equivalence class α+pZ[θ] of Z[θ]/pZ[θ], there is a ring homomorphism
ϕ : α+pZ[θ] 7→ α+pOK ∈ OK/pOK . This homomorphism does not depend
on which representative α is chosen, since pZ[θ] ⊆ pOK .
We claim that this is an isomorphism. We start by showing injectivity.
Take α+pZ[θ] ∈ ker(ϕ). Then, the representative α ∈ Z[θ] satisfies α = px ∈
pOK for some x ∈ OK . But then, the element x+Z[θ] of the additive group
OK/Z[θ] has an order dividing p since p(x+Z[θ]) = α+Z[θ] = 0 +Z[θ]. By
Lagrange’s theorem for (additive) groups, the order of an element of OK/Z[θ]
must divide [OK/Z[θ]]. Hence, this order is 1. But then x ∈ Z[θ] and hence
α = px ∈ pZ[θ] and finally α+ pZ[θ] = 0 + pZ[θ], so our arbitrary element of
the kernel is the zero element.
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Next, we show surjectivity. Take any x ∈ OK . Then, by Lagrange’s
theorem for the additive group OK/Z[θ], we have l(x+Z[θ]) = 0 +Z[θ], i.e.,
lx ∈ Z[θ]. On the other hand, since p 6 |l, l has an inverse l′ + pZ in Zp,
i.e., ll′ = 1 + kp, k ∈ Z. But now we can take l′lx ∈ Z[θ] and map it to
ϕ(l′lx+ Z[θ]) = x+ kpx+ pOK = x+OK . This shows the surjectivity.
ii) We have the isomorphism OK/pOK ∼= Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t].
This follows using Z[θ] ∼= Z[t]/m(t)Z[t] as follows. First, note that
p(Z[θ]) ∼= p(Z[t]/m(t)Z[t]) = pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t]
m(t)Z[t]
. (4.7)
So from part (i) we obtain
OK/pOK ∼= Z[θ]/pZ[θ]
∼= Z[t]/m(t)Z[t]
/
p(Z[t]/m(t)Z[t])
= Z[t]/m(t)Z[t]
/
(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/(m(t)Z[t])
(Third Isomorphism Theorem) ∼= Z[t]/(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])
(Third Isomorphism Theorem) ∼= Z[t]/pZ[t]
/
(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/pZ[t]
∼= Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t].
iii) The maximal ideals of Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t] are those generated by the equiv-
alence classes pii(t) +m(t)Zp[t] irreducible factors pii(t) of m(t).
There is a canonical and maximality-preserving one-to-one correspon-
dence between the ideals of Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t] and the ideals of Zp[t] containing
m(t)Zp[t]. We regard it as known from the theory of polynomial rings that
the maximal ideals of Zp[t] containing m(t)Zp[t] are exactly pii(t)Zp[t]. Their
canonical correspondents in Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t] are
(pii(t)Zp[t] +m(t)Zp[t])/m(t)Zp[t] = pii(t)(Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]).
For the rest of the proof we assume that the prime ideals are indexed so
that the isomorphic image of pi/pOK in Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t] is pii(t)(Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]).
This is what is meant by ’a suitable indexing’ in the statement of the theorem.
iv) The number of prime factors pii(t) equals that of the prime factors pi,
i.e., g = gp.
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This follows directly from (iii).
v) The exponents are given by fi = ∂pii(t).
We have the following chain of isomorphisms
OK/pi
(Third Isomorphism Theorem) ∼= OK/pOK
/
pi/pOK .
Next, using parts (ii) and (iii) of the proof and recalling that by the Third
Isomorphism Theorem, pi/pOK is a maximal ideal of OK/pOK , we obtain
OK/pi ∼= Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]
/
(pii(t)Zp[t] +m(t)Zp[t])/m(t)Zp[t]
∼= Zp[t]/(pii(t)Zp[t] +m(t)Zp[t])
= Zp[t]/pii(t)Zp[t],
Where the second step applied the Third Isomorphism Theorem again, and
the third steps uses the fact that pii(t) is a factor of m(t). Finally, us-
ing this isomorphism of the rings, we immediately obtain pfi = |OK/pi| =
|Zp[t]/pii(t)Zp[t]| = p∂pii(t).
vi) The multiplicity ei of a prime-ideal factor equals that of its isomorphic
image in Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t], i.e., the multiplicity i of an irreducible polynomial
factor.
Recall that py part (iii), under the isomorphism between OK/pOK and
Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t], the maximal ideals pi/pOK become pii(t)Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]. Now,
denote m(t) =
∏g
i=1 pii(t)
i and consider
(pi/pOK)
k ∼= 〈pii(t) +m(t)Zp[t]〉k
= 〈pii(t)k +m(t)Zp[t]〉
= 〈gcd(pii(t)k,m(t)) +m(t)Zp[t]〉
= 〈pii(t)min{k,i} +m(t)Zp[t]〉
Hence, the ideal pi/pOK has i distinct powers. (Note that all the i powers
of pii(t) are different modulo m(t).)
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On the other hand, using the definition of a product ideal, (pi/pOK)
k can
be expressed by its generators in OK/pOK , giving
(pi/pOK)
k = 〈∪{aj}kj=1⊂pi
k∏
j=1
(aj + pOK)〉
= 〈∪{aj}kj=1⊂pi(
k∏
j=1
aj + pOK)〉
The OK-representatives of the generators are
∪b∈pOK ∪{aj}kj=1⊂pi (
k∏
j=1
aj + b)
(Definition of ideal sum) = pki + pOK
(Lemma 79) = gcd(pki , pOK)
= p
min{ei,k}
i .
Hence, the product ideal can be expressed as
(pi/pOK)
k = 〈pmin{ei,k}i /pOK〉
(the generators are an ideal of OK/pOK) = p
min{ei,k}
i /pOK .
So the ideal pi/pOK has ei distinct powers. Thus, ei = i.
vii) The generator-representation of the prime ideals dividing pOK are pi =
〈Πi(θ), p〉.
We have the generators of the maximal ideals of the ring Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]
isomorphic to OK/pOK . All we have to do is to go backwards the chain of
isomorphisms. We recall that all isomorphisms except for the last one and
the two first ones (which are the first one and the two last ones now that we
work backwards) are due to the Third Isomorphism Theorem
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pii(t) +m(t)Zp[t] ∈ Zp[t]/m(t)Zp[t]7→ ↓
(Πi(t) + pZ[t]) + [(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/pZ[t]] ∈ Z[t]/pZ[t]
/
(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/pZ[t]
7→ ↓
Πi(t) + (pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t]) ∈ Z[t]/(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])7→ ↓
(Πi(t) +m(t)Z[t])+
(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/m(t)Z[t] ∈ Z[t]/m(t)Z[t]
/
(pZ[t] +m(t)Z[t])/m(t)Z[t]
7→ ↓
Πi(θ) + pZ[θ] ∈ Z[θ]/pZ[θ]7→ ↓
Πi(θ) + pOK ∈ OK/pOK .
Hence, we have pi/pOK = 〈Πi(θ) + pOK〉. This can be lifted from OK/pOK
to OK as pi = 〈Πi(θ), p〉.
Lemma 97. If p2 does not divide ∆(1, θ, ..., θn−1), then p cannot divide [OK :
Z[θ]].
Proof. Denote the Z-basis of OK by β1, ..., βn, giving a unique coefficient
matrix M ∈ Zn×n such that
1
θ
...
θn−1
 = M

β1
β2
...
βn
 . (4.8)
But by the Lemma 35 and the definition of ∆K this implies ∆(1, θ, ..., θn−1) =
(det M)2∆K . Next, from the theory of free abelian groups, [OK : Z[θ]] =
det M and by Lemma 46, ∆K ∈ Z \ {0}. Hence, ∆(1, θ, ..., θn−1) = [OK :
Z[θ]]2∆K is a product of two integers and if p divides [OK : Z[θ]] then p2
divides ∆(1, θ, ..., θn−1).
The condition above for p not dividing [OK : Z[θ]] is sufficient but not nec-
essary. However, the preceding lemma gives a finite number of primes p that
can possibly divide [OK : Z[θ]], after which the following equivalence-form
condition is available. The following theorem it a computationally efficient
condition, and it can also be used to yield a computationally efficient way to
find the ring of integers OK .
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Notation 98. Define the following notation for the next theorem: m(x) ∈
Z[x] is the monic polynomial of θ and ¯ denotes reduction modulo p. Let
pii ∈ Zp[x] be the distinct irreducible factors of m¯(x), i.e.,
m¯(x) =
g∏
i=1
pii(x)
ei .
Let Πi(x) ∈ Z[x] be any monic polynomials such that Πi(x) ≡ pii(x) (mod
p). Define
l(x) =
g∏
i=1
Πi(x)
h(x) =
g∏
i=1
Πi(x)
ei−1
so that l(x)h(x) is a monic lift of m¯(x). Finally, set
f(x) =
l(x)h(x)−m(x)
p
∈ Z[x]. (4.9)
Theorem 99 ([3], Theorem 6.1.4.(2)). Consider a finite field extension K =
Q(θ) of Q, where θ ∈ OK. With the notation defined above, a prime p divides
[OK : Z[θ]] if and only if gcd(f¯(x), l¯(x), h¯(x)) 6= 1 in Zp[x].
4.3.2 Special cases: the Buchmann-Lenstra algorithm
Dedekind’s theorem provides an easy way to compute the prime ideals divid-
ing 〈p〉 as long as p does not factor [OK : Z[θ]]. However, it might of course
happen that p|[OK : Z[θ]]. There might still exist, a lazy mathematician
could argue, a value θ′ ∈ OK such that OK = Z[θ′], but this trick will not
always work.
Example 100. (This is an example due to Dedekind and reproduced by
Stein in [27], Section 5.3.1, with computer algebra calculations.) Let θ be a
root of x3 + x2 − 2x+ 8 and K = Q(θ). Then, the ideal 〈2〉 of OK has three
distinct prime-ideal factors. Now, if there existed any θ′ ∈ OK such that
the ideal 〈2〉 could be computed by Dedekind’s theorem, then the minimal
polynomial m of θ′ should split into three distinct and hence first-degree
factors over Z2, but Z2 only has two distinct first-degree polynomials.
Hence the only way to deal with this is to really find a method other that
that presented in Theorem 94. The final answer to the question of how to
find the prime-ideal decomposition for the problematic primes is algorithmic
and due to not Dedekind but Buchmann and Lenstra.
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Algorithm 101 (Buchmann-Lenstra). Let K = Q(θ) be a finite extension.
For any ideal 〈p〉 of OK, there is an algorithm to find the two-generator rep-
resentations and the exponents of the ideals in the prime-ideal decomposition
of 〈p〉, given only the minimal polynomial of θ and the Z-basis of OK.
We point out that for evaluating the Dedekind zeta series, this algorithm
is an overkill. Two ways to optimize the numerical computations are pre-
sented in Remark 108. However, this algorithm yields a complete theory
with not much extra work.
By the following theorem, we denote extensions of Zp by Zp(α), but ac-
tually all the computations in our proof of the algorithm do not require the
knowledge that there is a particular primitive element.
Theorem 102 (Primitive element theorem). Let F : E be a finite field
extension. Then, there is an element α ∈ F such that F = E(α) if and only
if the number of intermediate fields F : H : E is finite.
In addition, the following definition and lemma are separated from the
proof of the algorithm.
Definition 103. We define the p-radical Ip of OK as
Ip = {x ∈ OK |xm ∈ pOK for some m ∈ N}.
Lemma 104. Denote the prime-ideal pactorization of 〈p〉 as 〈p〉 = ∏gi=1 peii .
Then, Ip is the ideal product of the distinct prime ideals, Ip =
∏g
i=1 pi.
Proof. Let us first show the inclusion Ip ⊆
∏g
i=1 pi. Take x ∈ Ip. Then by
definition xm ∈ 〈p〉 and since ideal inclusion and factorization are equivalent,
we have pi ⊇ 〈p〉 for all prime factors, so x ∈ ∩gi=1pi. Finally, since the prime
ideals pi are distinct, Cor. 79 yields ∩gi=1pi =
∏g
i=1 pi 3 x.
Now we prove the inclusion Ip ⊇
∏g
i=1 pi. Take any x ∈
∏g
i=1 pi. Next,
take m = max1≤i≤g ei and xm ∈
∏g
i=1 p
m
i = 〈p〉
∏g
i=1 p
m−ei
i ⊆ 〈p〉. Hence,
xm ∈ 〈p〉.
Remark 105. The preceding lemma implies in particular that Ip is an ideal
and that Imaxi eip ⊆ 〈p〉 and consequently x ∈ Ip ⇔ xn ∈ 〈p〉 (note that
maxi ei ≤ n so xn ∈ Imaxi eip ⊆ 〈p〉).
One more easy lemma should be extracted from the proof of the algo-
rithm.
Lemma 106. Let a be any ideal factoring 〈p〉. Then, all non-zero elements
of OK/a and a/〈p〉 have an additive order of p.
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Proof. Firtsly, since a ⊇ 〈p〉 = pOK by Lemma 76, then in particular for any
[a] = a + a ∈ OK/a we have p[a] = pa + a = [0]OK/a since pa ∈ pOK ⊆ a.
But by Lagrange’s theorem for the additive group OK/a this implies that
ord([a])|p. Hence, using the primality of p, all elements other than [0]OK/a
have order p. The proof for a/〈p〉 is identical.
This lemma and Remark 105 allow us to show the following computational
result.
Algorithm 107. Given OK, there is a computationally efficient way to find
Ip.
Proof. Lemma 106 implies that the Z-basis of OK is the Zp-basis of OK/〈p〉.
On the other hand, in commutative rings R where p = 0, R 3 x 7→ xp ∈ R is
a ring homomorphism R→ R, called the Frobenius homomorphism. Hence,
x 7→ xp is a homomorphism OK/〈p〉 → OK/〈p〉 and in particular, it has
a Zn×np -matrix representation in the Zp. This representation is efficient to
compute, since it only requires considering the basis elements.
Next, by Remark 105, the quotient Ip/〈p〉 is the kernel of the mapOK/〈p〉 3
x 7→ xlp ∈ OK/〈p〉, where lp ≥ n. But this map has a matrix representation
as the lth power of the Frobenius matrix. Hence, Ip/〈p〉 is in the basis of OK
given by the kernel of this matrix.
Proof of Algorithm 101. (This algorithm is given in [3], Secs. 6.2.2-6.2.5,
with an emphasis on computational matters. Not all subalgorithms such as
ideal division and multiplication are discribed here, but the theoretical part
is given more explicitly. In practise, the ideal divisions and multiplications
are done in the pn-element ring R := OK/〈p〉, since there is a one-to-one
maximality-preserving correspondence between the ideals of OK containing
〈p〉 and the ideals. By Lemma 106, all basis of the different quotient groups
considered in this proof can be constructed of elements of OK , just recalling
that they have additive order p.) For the sake of clarity, the algorithm is
divided into steps here.
i) We can calculate explicitly the bases for a sequence of ideals Hj such
that if 〈p〉 = ∏gi=1 peii , then Hj = ∏ei=j pi.
For this part, start from finding the basis for Ip as described in Lemma
107. Next, define the sequences of ideals (for which the product formulation
is obtained using Lemmas 104 and 79)
Kj = I
j
p + 〈p〉 =
g∏
i=1
p
min(ei,j)
i
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and
Jj = KjK
−1
j−1 =
∏
ei≥j
pi
and finally,
Hj = JjJ
−1
j+1 =
∏
ei=j
pi.
Hence, with ideal multiplication and division algorithms with basis output
available, this involves no complications.
ii) The ring OK/Hj (and hence R/(Hj/〈p〉) by the Third Isomorphism
Theorem) is isomorphic to a product of fields Zp(α1)×...×Zp(αk), where
αi are roots of irreducible polynomials over Zp and k is the number of
prime ideals factoring Hj.
First off, to ease notation, assume that the prime ideals pi factoring Hj
are labelled i = 1, ..., k for the remainder of this proof.
Now, for an element of OK , denote α, for its homomorphic image in
OK/Hj denote [α] and inOK/pi denote [α]i. Consider the map ϕ : OK/Hj →
OK/p1 × ... ×OK/pk given by ϕ([α]) = ([α]1, ..., [α]k). (Since pi ⊇ Hj, this
does not depend on the choice of representative α, so the map is well-defined.)
This is an isomorphism; it is clearly homomorphic and it is injective since
its kernel is {[α]|α ∈ ∩ki=1pi =
∏k
i=1 pi = Hj} = {0OK/Hj}. Finally, it
is surjective since the cardinality of the target domain equals that of the
domain:
∏k
i=1 |OK/pi| =
∏k
i=1 N(pi) = N(
∏k
i=1 pi) = N(Hj) = |OK/Hj|.
(Alternatively, the surjectivity can be shown using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem. Even more, the Chinese Remainder Theorem is actually equivalent
to the statement that ϕ : OK/p1...pk → OK/p1×...×OK/pk as defined above
is an isomorphism.)
To complete this step, note that OK/pi is a finite field by Theorem 61(a),
and by Lemma 106 its subfield generated by [1]i is isomorphic to Zp. Since
a finite field has a finite number of subsets (subfields), we can denote, using
Theorem 102 that OK/pi ∼= Zp(αi), where αi is a root of an irreducible
polynomial over Zp (in an abstract sense, so this is not an element of OK).
iii) Given a Zp-basis of R/(Hj/〈p〉) (which is quite easily computable as
the Zp-bases of R and Hj/〈p〉 are known), there is a computationally
efficient way to find Zp-bases for the isomorphic images of the different
fields in the representation given in part (ii).
Denote
A := R/(Hj/〈p〉) ∼= Zp(α1)× ...× Zp(αk).
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First off, we provide a test that shows, whether A is a field itself. Consider
the map ψ : A → A given by ψ(x) = xp − x = (xp−1 − 1)x. This is linear
for rings where p = 0 such as A, so we can find its matrix representation in
the basis of A. Now, consider ψ in the isomorphic ring Zp(α1)× ...×Zp(αk).
By Lagrange’s theorem for the group (Z∗p, ·, 1), (xp−1 − 1)x = 0 for all the p
elements of Zp, so xp − x = (x− 1)...(x− p). Hence, this polynomial has no
other zeroes in any of the component fields Zp(αi). Finally, in the notation
of Zp(α1)× ...×Zp(αk) ∼= A, we have, using linearity of ψ and the kernels of
each component,
ker(ψ) ∼= spanZp{(1, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1)}.
Hence, dimZp ker(ψ) = k. This allows computing k efficiently in the numeri-
cal matrix computations.
Next, assume k ≥ 2. The strategy is to show that using an idempotent
element  ∈ A \ {0, 1} such that 2 = , we can always find a (non-trivial)
splitting of A in the sense
A ∼= (Zp(αi1)× ...× Zp(αik−l))× (Zp(αik−l+1)× ...× Zp(αik)).
Hence, working inductively, we can always find the isomorphic images of each
Zp(αi). To prove the validity of our strategy, recall first that fields have no
non-trivial ideals, so all ideals of A are in the isomorphic ring Zp(α1)× ...×
Zp(αk) of the from
Zp(αi1)× ...× Zp(αik−l)× {0} × ...× {0}.
Now, take the two ideals A and (1−)A of A, where  is the idempotent.
We claim that these ideals will provide the non-trivial splitting in the sense
that
A ∼= (Zp(αi1)× ...× Zp(αik−l))× {0} × ...× {0}
(1− )A ∼= {0} × ...× {0} × (Zp(αik−l+1)× ...× Zp(αik)).
First, the ideals A and (1−) are non-trivial, since they are not zero and not
equal to A since neither  nor (1− ) is a unit by (1− ) = 0. Second, any
a ∈ A can be written as a = a+(1−)a, so in the view of Zp(α1)×...×Zp(αk),
each component Z(αi) must be non-zero in at least one of the ideals. Third,
A∩ (1−)A = {0}, since if a1 = (1−)a2, then a1 = 2a1 = (−2)a2 = 0.
Hence, in the view of Zp(α1)× ...×Zp(αk), each component must be non-zero
in at most one of the two ideals. Hence, the ideals indeed privide a splitting.
The bases of these ideals are obtained by multiplying the basis elements of
A and removing Zp-linearly dependent elements.
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Now it remains to find an idempotent explicitly. Again in the notation of
Zp(α1) × ... × Zp(αk), 1A becomes (1, 1, ..., 1). Now, consider xA ∈ ker(ψ) \
spanZp{1A}, whose correspondent in Zp(α1)× ...× Zp(αk) is x = (β1, ..., βk),
where βi ∈ Zp and not all equal. The minimal polynomial m : A→ A of xA,
is hence
m(t) = lcm((t− β11A), ..., (t− βk1A)) =
∏
all distinct βi
(t− βi1A)
since, in the view of Zp(α1)× ...×Zp(αk), every element in the lcm operator
makes one of the k components of m(xA) become zero. Now, it is obvious
that whatever factorization m(t) = m1(t)m2(t) is considered, the factors are
coprime polynomials of Zp[t]. Hence, by the polynomial gcd algorithm, we
can find U(t), V (t) ∈ Zp[t] such that
U(t)m1(t) = 1− V (t)m2(t).
Finally, choosing  by the above polynomials and the kernel element xA as
 = U(xA)m1(xA) ∈ A,
we have
2 = U(xA)m1(xA)(1−V (xA)m2(xA)) = −U(xA)V (xA)m1(xA)m2(xA) = ,
since m1(xA)m2(xA) = m(xA) = 0.
iv) Having found the Zp-bases for the isomorphic images of the different
fields in A := R/(Hj/〈p〉) ∼= Zp(α1)× ...×Zp(αk), we can find the con-
tribution of pi|Hj to the Dedekind zeta function and the OK-generators
of the maximal ideals factoring Hj.
Let us first consider what is needed for approximating the Dedekind zeta
function. Note that ideals of Zp(α1) × ... × Zp(αk) are products of ideals of
each field and that the ideals of a field are trivial. Hence maximal ideals
Ii := (pi/〈p〉)/(Hj/〈p〉) of A become in the isomophism
{0} × Zp(α2)× ...× Zp(αk),
or
Zp(α1)× {0} × Zp(α3)× ...× Zp(αk)
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etc. For evaluating the Dedekind zeta function, note that by a furious use of
the Third Isomorphism Theorem,
OK/pi (4.10)
∼= OK/〈p〉
/
pi/〈p〉 (4.11)
∼=
(
OK/〈p〉
/
Hj/〈p〉
)/(
pi/〈p〉
/
Hj/〈p〉
)
(4.12)
= A/Ii ∼= Zp(αi) (4.13)
so N(pi) = |OK/pi| = |Zp(αi)| = pd, where d is the Zp-dimension of the ideal
of A isomorphic to Zp(αi). Hence, having the Zp-bases of these ideals from
step (iii), we are done.
For finding the prime ideals of OK explicitly, note that one generating
set of Ii = (pi/〈p〉)/(Hj/〈p〉) is the union of the bases of all the fields in the
field product representation of Ii. This can be lifted to a generating set of
pi/〈p〉 as an additive group by choosing representatives of Ii in OK/〈p〉 and
taking union with the basis of Hj/〈p〉. Repeating this idea, the generating set
of pi/〈p〉 as an additive group lifted to OK together with the basis of pOK
generates the additive group (and hence also the ideal) pi in OK . Then,
Ref. [3] presents Algorithm 4.7.10 that reduces the number of generators
of a prime ideal. This algorithm would once again require much theory not
presented in this work. We point out that in a theoretical approach, one
could find a relatively small set of generators for the ideal pi by using the
primitive elements of the isomorphic images of Zp(αi). However, this would
be a long proof and computationally inefficient.
Remark 108. For numerical evaluations of the Dedekind zeta function, it is
actually not necessary to compute steps (iii)–(iv) of the proof, see Ref. [3],
exercise 8 for Section 6. Nevertheless, this algorithm is somewhat shorter to
prove with the tools at hand.
Another (less efficient) shortcut for Dedekind zeta evaluations that will
not essentially change the proof is not to define the ideals Hj, Jj, and Kj
or worry about ideal multiplications and divisions but only operate on the
p-radical Ip =
∏
pi|〈p〉 pi. Then, just replace Hj by Ip in steps (ii)–(iv) and
obtain the values of |OK/pi| as suggested in the first paragraph of step (iv).
A way to view this shortcut is that we skip something in the algorithm and
the information we lose is the powers ei, which are irrelevant for computing
the local Euler factors.
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4.4 Algebraic lattices
As a final word on algebraic number theory, we return to the connection
between design of full-diversity lattices and field extensions. We start from
a definition.
Definition 109. Let K : Q be a finite algebraic extension of degree n with
integral basis {ωi}ni=1, real embeddings {σi}si=1, and truly complex embed-
dings {σi, σi}s+ti=s+1. Then, the algebraic lattice of K is the lattice in Rn
generated by
M =

σ1(ω1) ... σ1(ωn)
...
σs(ω1) ... σs(ωn)
<σs+1(ω1) ... <σs+1(ωn)
...
<σs+t(ω1) ... <σs+t(ωn)
=σs+1(ω1) ... =σs+1(ωn)
...
=σs+t(ω1) ... =σs+t(ωn)

.
Remark 110. The lattice generated by this matrix is independent of the
choice of integer basis ωi, and re-labelling the embeddings σi permutes the
axes.
It is also worth pointing out that this indeed is a full-rank lattice. First,
the colums of M are linearly independent over Z as required in the defini-
tion of lattice generator matrices. For a proof, assume there exist lattice
coordinates {αi}ni=1 such that (Mα)j = σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi) = 0 for all j ≤ s and
(Mα)s+j + i(Mα)s+t+j = σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi) = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. But ker(σj)
is trivial, so this implies that αi = 0 for all i. Second, the additive subgroup
generated byM is discrete since a suitable product in the coordinates ofMα
yields the algebraic norm of
∑n
i=1 αiωi, and for α 6= 0 the norm is a non-zero
integer, so lattice vectors Mα cannot be arbitrarily short.
Notation 111. Throughout this and the next section, K, ωi, σj, s, t, M ,
and n will be as in the preceding definition if not otherwise stated.
Recalling the objective of full diversity (see Definition 17 and the asymp-
totic probability bounds in Section 3.3.4), the following two results will turn
our attention to algebraic lattices of totally real field extensions. As a by-
product, it is a counterpart of Example 20, showing that algebraic field ex-
tensions allow designing lattices of any desired diversity.
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Lemma 112. Let K : Q have s real and 2t truly complex embeddings. Then,
the algebraic lattice of K has diversrity s+ t.
Proof. Let us represent the points of the algebraic lattice with their lattice
coordinates {αi}ni=1. Recall that this representation is unique and in partic-
ular, Mα = 0⇔ α = 0. The diversity L is given by minα 6=0 l(0,Mα).
First, we have L ≥ s + t since for a real embedding σj, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, we
have (Mα)j = σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi), which is non-zero for α 6= 0. For a complex
embedding σs+j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, at least one of (Mα)s+j = <σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi) and
(Mα)s+t+j = =σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi) is non-zero. Hence, for any α 6= 0, at least
s+ t components of Mα are non-zero.
Second, we have L ≤ s + t since taking α such that ∑ni=1 αiωi = 1 we
have σj(
∑n
i=1 αiωi) = 1 for all j and hence Mα = (1, ..., 1, 0, ...0) has s + t
non-zero components.
Corollary 113. An algebraic lattice is of full diversity if and only if it is
totally real, i.e., all the roots of the generating polynomial are real.
Remark 114. It is worth pointing out that generalized notions of full diver-
sity exist for different lattice code problems, with their respective algebraic
constructions. For example, a full-diversity matrix lattice is a discrete addi-
tive group of matrices (whose vectorizations hence form a lattice) where no
matrix has a zero row. The probability bounds for block fading channels mo-
tivate the study of such matrix lattices. Then, full-diversity matrix lattices
of two-column matrices in vectorized form can be constructed from algebraic
lattices of totally complex extensions; each row of a matrix corresponding to
a vector Mα is (<σj(x),=σj(x)), where
∑n
i=1 αiωi, and hence non-zero.
It is also possible to consider relative number-field extensions, e.g., Q(α, i) :
Q(i), where Q(α) is totally real. Then we define full diversity as the relative
extension degree. Both of these examples are however out of the scope of
this thesis.
For the rest of this section, let us study the connection of the number-
theoretic properties of totally real extensions and the geometric properties of
their lattices. Let K : Q be such a field extension and Λ the lattice. First,
using Lemma 15, and the definition of ∆K , we immediately have
Vol(Λ) = | det(M)| =
√
∆K .
Second, the the coordinate product of a point in Λ with lattice coordinates
α is given by
n∏
j=1
σj(
n∑
i=1
αiωi) = NK/Q(
n∑
i=1
αiωi).
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Recalling that {ωi}ni=1 is an integral basis, this is an non-zero integer for
α 6= 0. Hence all lattice points x ∈ Λ lie on hyperbolic naps ∏ni=1 xi ∈ Z.
Since the algebraic norm of 1 is 1,
dp,min(Λ) = 1
for any field extension K : Q. Hence, in a unit-volume scaling of Λ, dp,min is
inversely proportional to Vol(Λ) =
√
∆K .
Third, the unique shortest non-zero vectors of Λ are ±(1, ..., 1) corre-
sponding to ±1 ∈ K. This is since (±1, ...,±1) are the unique shortest
vectors of the innermost hyperboloids
∏n
i=1 xi = ±1, and since σ|Q = idQ
for all embeddings σ, only ±(1, ..., 1) of the points (±1, ...,±1) belong to the
lattice Λ. Again, in a unit-volume scaling of Λ, the minimal vector-length is
hence inversely proportional to Vol(Λ) =
√
∆K .
Fourth, the asymptotic density of lattice points on the innermost hyper-
boloids NK(x) = ±1, equivalently, the density of lattice points corresponding
to O∗K , is by Theorem 55 controlled by the regulator of the underlying num-
ber field. For the rest of the hyperboloids, Lemma 85 shows that, e.g., if the
prime 2 is inert, then the nap
∏n
i=1 xi = 2 is empty.
Chapter 5
Algebraic lattice codes and coset
codes
Having the necessary tools of algebraic number theory and information theory
at our hands, we are now at a position to design algebraic lattices for lattice
codes and coset codes.
5.1 The reliability problem
In Section 3.3.4 we deduced that the reliability problem in Rayleigh fast fad-
ing channels asymptotically boils down to maximizing the minimum product
distance, which for a unit-volume scaling of the algebraic lattice of a totally
real extension is equivalent to minimizing the discriminant. Unluckily, this
is as far as number-theory helps us in this problem — there are no known
general methods for designing number fields with given discriminants. Nev-
ertheless, one can of course use tables of number fields to proceed using
algebraic lattices. Alternatively, there are also more advanced methods to
design rotations of Zn based on ideals of algebraic lattices [23]. Note that
all algebraic lattices have the unique minimal vectors ±(1, ..., 1), so no direct
algebraic lattice construction will yield full-diversity rotations of Zn.
The validity of designing lattices based on the minimum product has
been tested by simulations in numerous publications; see , e.g., [23]. For a
recent contribution, [14] found, among other results, the optimal rotation of
Z2 by simulating all possible rotations for different signalling constellations.
It seemed that independently of the considered signalling constellation, as
γb grows, the optimal algebraic rotation turns to yield the optimal angle.
This is of course natural in the sense that the optimal algebraic rotation
minimizes the minimum product distance, which in turn is dominates the
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asymptotic expression for the REP at γb → ∞. It should nevertheless be
mentioned that at low SNRs, some other rotations performed slightly better
than the algebraic ones, with the Hadamard rotations obtained as a low-SNR
asymptotics both theoretically and computationally. Hadamard rotations
seem to perform well also in slightly different fading models [17].
As a conclusion, we refer to a vast amount of literature and numerical
data to state that algebraic methods based on the minimum product distance
yield very good code lattices for Rayleigh fast fading channels with a good
signal quality, equivalently, large γb. As a consequence, good coset codes
should also be searched amongst full-diversity lattices.
5.2 The security problem
5.2.1 Number-theoretic objectives
Let us here briefly formulate the number-theoretic problems derived from the
ECDP estimates of Section 3.3.4. These criteria pose the lattice design prob-
lem in a number-theoretic way, and they were the starting point of this thesis.
It is worth to warn already at this stage that by our numerical computations,
it seems that the inverse norm sum (INS) (5.1) below turned out not to be
a good approximation of the ECDP in the sense that it seems to correlate
with the actual performance of the lattices well enough only to distinguish
the lattices that are poor for the applications, whereas the interesting cases
cannot be ordered by the INS estimate. This will be considered in detail in
[16] and subsequent numerical computations if this thesis.
Let us now derive the number-theoretic criteria. As already mentioned in
Section 3.3.4, dropping the ones in the denominators of Eq. (3.8), except in
the term for the lattice point x = 0, we obtain a number-theoretic problem.
With the tools of algebraic lattices from the preceding section at our hands,
taking Λb to be the algebraic lattice, (3.8) then becomes (see also [1])
Pc,e ≤
√
∆K
2m
(
γm/2e + γ
−m
e
∑
0 6=x∈Λe∩R
m∏
i=1
1
|NK(x)|3
)
, (5.1)
where x is the algebraic integer corresponding to the point x of the sublattice
Λe, and the series has been truncated over a finite sending region R. If
the series is not truncated, it diverges since the Dirichlet Unit Theorem 48
guarantees that any totally real number field, except Q itself, has infinitely
many units x ∈ O∗K with NK(x) = ±1. This formula and our examinations
on the properties of totally real number fields directly imply that we would
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like to minimize the factor ∆K in front of the sum, maximize the regulator to
have points with NK(x) = ±1 sparsely located and have small primes inert
to have the hyperboloids NK(x) = ±2,±3 empty.
Motivated by this, we study here the effect of the discriminant, prime
ramification, and the regulator of the underlying totally real number field on
the ECDP approximates of the algebraic lattice code. We do not use Eq.
(5.1) for the reasons mentioned above, but choose instead Eq. (3.8), which
is asymptotic at γe → 0+ and yields values less than one. In order to keep
the length of the thesis under control, we mainly refer to subsequent work
[16] that followed this thesis for a geometric explanation to the behaviour of
the ECDP.
5.2.2 Numerical computations
We are now at the stage of being ready to compare the importance of the
three design criteria for algebraic lattices of totally real algebraic number
fields. The strategy of the computations is as follows. First, we generated
(pseudo-)randomly integer polynomials of degree four and picked those that
are irreducible and generate totally real number fields. Then, the discrim-
inant, regulator, and the prime ramification can be examined by the tools
presented in the sections considering algebraic number theory. These com-
putations were not implemented from scratch, since there are several free
softwares for algebraic number theory, of which we chose to use PARI gp
[4]. After obtaining the number-theoretic quantities, any numerical software
can be used to compute the probability estimates (3.8) and the inverse norm
sums (5.1) of any finite constellation. We transferred the results from PARI
gp to MATLAB for this sum evaluation and plotting.
As for technical details, all lattices Λb were scaled to unit volume, a
sublattice Λe = 2Λb was chosen, and the sending region was chosen to be the
radius 15 origin-centered ball. The large enough radius guarantees that the
usefulness of lattice coset codes is not ruined by the boundary effects, and,
as was also confirmed computationally, that the average of ‖x‖2, describing
the average transmission power, and the number of code points does not vary
significantly. Computationally efficient enumeration of the lattice points in
such a ball given a generator matrix M is not trivial. Here it was done
based on the eigenvalues of the Gram matrix MTM of the lattice, but we
point out that this approach is not feasible in much larger dimensions. Then,
one would need to implement, e.g., a sphere decoder algorithm (see [23]) to
find the short vectors. Signal quality values that we are interested in were
decided based on the approximative formulae derived in Appendix B. This
would suggest the interval 0.55 ≤ γe ≤ 7.5. This choice of range seems quite
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Figure 5.1: Base two logarithms of probability bounds for code from ran-
domly generated algebraic lattices as a function of γe. Red: smallest values
of the INS bound (5.1) amongst the lattices. Green: largest values of the
tighter bound (3.8). Blue: smallest values of the tighter bound. Largest
values of the bound (5.1) were considerably larger.
good in the sense that at the upper bound, the tighter ECDP bound also
yields one, and at the lower bound, the ECDP estimate yields approximately
|Λb/Λe|, i.e., the eavesdropper receives a uniform random coset class.
On the validity of the inverse norm sum approximation
To illustrate the problems of the INS Eq.(5.1), we plot the smallest INS
amongst our 474 randomly generated algebraic lattices as a function of γe;
see Fig. 5.1. In no case is this quantity smaller than 1. This was predicted
in the discussion in Section 3.3.4, since the INS is a valid approximation of
the bound (3.8) in a good signal quality limit γe → ∞, but the formula
(3.8) in turn is derived based on a poor signal quality limit of the ECDP in
AWGN channels (see Appendices A.2.1-A.2.2 for the derivation and Section
3.3.4 for discussion). As an unfortunate result, the INS never approximates
the ECDP. It could of course happen that the INS correlates with the ECDP
even if it is not a good approximation. This possibility will be discussed
later with numerical data. Regarding the generality of our computations,
other indices [Λb/Λe] can be obtained by sclaing Λb, which will only affect
the Vol(Λb) factor in both compared probability estimates. Other dimensions
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were not computed, but one can expect similar behaviour.
Let us yet compare the two probability bounds. The reasoning that the
INS (5.1) approximates (3.8) only when (3.8) is not valid anymore is very
much supported by the results in Fig. 5.1. Consider first large values of γe.
The tighter estimate (3.8) yields values larger than one and equal to those
of the lowest INS for good signal qualities, approximately γe ≥ 6, which is
already near the upper bound of the range of interest 0.55 ≤ γe ≤ 7.5. At
values γe ≈ 7.5 Eve decodes the lattice Λb correctly, and hence coset coding
is not interesting (see Appendix B). For small γe, contrary to the INS, the
bound (3.8) tends to the uniform random limit |Λb/Λe| = 2−4, in particular
yielding a tight estimate for most of the interesting range of γe. The INS
tends to infinity.
For more discussion on the INS we refer to [16]. We point out also that
the tighter ECDP bound (3.8), is motivated in [16] in terms of ordering the
lattices according to the ECDP for all interesting values of γe. In addition,
it is proven that for small γe = σ2h/σ2, the bound (3.8) is asymptotic with an
error O(σ2h/σ2) and will consequently yield values less than one.
Effect of the number-theoretic invariants on the ECDP
Even though the interest for the study of the number-theoretic design criteria,
i.e., minimizing the discriminant, maximizing the regulator and having small
inert primes, is somewhat decreased by the fact that they are most visible
in the problematic inverse norm sum approximation, we study here briefly
their effect on the more accurate ECDP approximate (3.8). Naturally, they
are also interesting in their own right, as well as the INS, from a purely
mathematical point of view. Furthermore, Bob’s decoding error probability
bound (3.4) yields an inverse norm sum type problem at its asymptotically
tight limit γb → ∞ if we consider full-diversity matrix lattices constructed
from totally complex extensions as discussed in Remark 114.
The probability bound (3.8), denoted Pc,e,upper, is plotted as a function
of the discriminant, regulator, and the first inert prime of the underlying
number field in Fig. 5.2. As it is obvious from the plots, there is a strong
correlation between the discriminant and the ECDP approximate. The prime
ramification seems not to affect the ECDP in any way, which could also be
verified by computing the experimental means and variances of the ECDP
estimate over the families of field extensions with different prime ramifica-
tions. Finally, there is a correlation between the regulator and the ECDP
estimate, but it is “the wrong way around”; if the density of units had a
significant effect on the estimate, low ECDP estimates should be obtained
for large regulator values instead of small. It seems that this correlation
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Figure 5.2: The ECDP estimates (3.8) for the channel parameter values
γe = 1 and γe = 3 for lattice codes based on randomly generated field
extensions as a function of the discriminant, regulator, and prime ramification
of the underlying extension. Similar plots were obtained for other relevant
values of γe.
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of the regulator and the ECDP bound is rather due to the interplay of the
discriminant and the regulator than a direct effect of regulator, since there
are various upper bounds for the discriminant in terms of regulator (see,
e.g., [26] and references therein) and the discriminant seems to predict the
ECDP estimate well. Similar insight is also implied by an inverse norm type
approximation in [13].
As a remark related to the plots in Fig. 5.2, we point out that there
is one field extension that behaves somewhat differently from the others in
the discriminant plots. This is due to repeated components in the generator
vectors, whose geometric effect is once again considered in [16]. The fact that
repeated components really cause such behaviour can be easily verified, e.g.,
by studying biquadratic extensions.
To give a heuristic explanation, the fact that the effect of the discrimi-
nant seems dominant is not particularly surprising since the regulator and
the prime ramification dictate the appearance of the lattice points with the
different algebraic norms, but the algebraic norms only appear in the prob-
lematic inverse norm sum approximation. Contrary to these, the discrimi-
nant has a geometric interpretation as a power of the inverse of the minimal
vector-length of the lattice. As is familiar from lattice coding, the minimal
vector-length, equivalently, the sphere-packing diameter, describes well the
properties of lattices in AWGN channels. This also holds for the security
of coset codes [15, 16]. Recalling from Remark 19 the interpretation of lat-
tice diversity as resistance of vector-lengths to fading, a full-diversity lattice
with a dense sphere packing is hence expected to pertain a reasonably dense
sphere-packing in fading, after which the channel is effectively gaussian.
On the geometric design of full-diversity lattices
Let us here discuss the statement that the effect of the discriminant on the
number-theoretic lattices is due to its geometric interpretation. The results
summarized in this section are motivated in detail with partial analytic re-
sults and more computational examples in [16].
Now, since the shortest vectors of any algebraic lattice are ±(1, ..., 1), a
large discriminant and hence a large volume of the lattice cell means that
the lattice has a poor sphere-packing density. Conceptually this is to say
that the lattice is “flat”: for any choice of a generator system (a lattice cell)
containing (1, ..., 1), there must be long vectors. It is worth pointing out at
this point that the rigorous opposite of flat lattices are well-rounded lattices,
i.e., lattices whose minimal vectors span Rn. There is an emerging study of
number-theoretic constructions of well-reounded lattices [9, 10] that might
in continuation be relevant also for this physical layer security problem.
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Figure 5.3: Left: the bound (3.8), denoted Pc,e,upper, as a function of the dis-
criminant for non-flat sublattices of algebraic lattices of randomly generated
totally real extensions.
Right: base two logarithm of Pc,e,upper as a fuction of γe for Z4 (red), the worst
(green) and the best (blue) full-diversity sublattices of the random algebraic
lattices.
Based on the interpretation of flat lattices, we implemented a heuristic
algorithm that finds a “less flat” sublattice of the original lattice. The algo-
rithm starts from an LLL-reduced basis of the algebraic lattice, i.e., roughly
speaking a basis of near-orthogonal and short vectors. Then, the shortest
generator vectors of the reduced basis are scaled by a suitable power of 2
to obtain the basis of a sublattice whose near-orthogonal generators have
lengths varying at most by a factor of 2. Intuitively, such a sublattice should
not be as flat as the original lattice, and as a sublattice of a full-diversity
lattice, it is of full diversity. However, we cannot by theoretical means ac-
cess the sphere-packing diameter of the lattice anymore, so we either have to
solve the shortest vectors computationally or trust the intuition on flat lat-
tices. ECDP bounds for such lattices are plotted in Fig. 5.3. The algorithm
and lattice reduction are also described more formally and in detail in [16].
After this sublattice procedure the ECDP seems not to depend on the
discriminant anymore, as can be seen from the first plot of Fig. 5.3. We
also notice that the ECDP estimate varies by only some 10% over the fam-
ily of lattices. Since we are only dealing with an estimate, it is hence not
straightforward to distinguish which of the lattices perform best without di-
rect simulations. Furthermore, comparing the values of the ECDP in this and
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Figure 5.4: The 10-base logarithm of the INS estimate and the tighter prob-
ability estimate (3.8), denoted Pc,e,upper.
Left: algebraic lattices of randomly generated totally real extensions.
Right: the non-flat sublattices
the previous example in Fig. 5.2, we can see that the sublattice procedure
vastly improved the ECDP so that all lattices perform as well as the best
algebraic lattices. In the second plot of Fig. 5.3, we compared the ECDP
estimates of the sublattices and Z4, finding that the full-diversity lattices
perform consistently better.
At this point, let us briefly go back to the INS, whose correlation with
the ECDP estimate remained unknown. For lattices that arise directly from
number fields, the INS is known to correlate with the discriminant (see [6] for
numerical evidence and [13] for an analytic estimate). Since the ECDP esti-
mate also correlates with the discriminant, one would expect a correlation of
the two estimates. This is indeed confirmed by our numerical results; see Fig.
5.4. However, after the sublattice algorithm described above, the INS esti-
mate (restricting the summation to the sublattice) shows no correlation with
the ECDP; see again Fig. 5.4. It should also be noted that the sublattices
that perform better than the original lattices in terms of the tighter bound
can attain considerably higher INS values than the original lattices. As a
conclusion of our comparison of probability estimates, it would be preferable
to use the tighter probability bound (3.8) for lattice design, and the correla-
tion of the INS and the tighter ECDP estimate for algebraic lattices seems
to occur rather due to both correlating with the discriminant than the two
estimates correlating in general.
CHAPTER 5. ALGEBRAIC LATTICE CODES AND COSET CODES 69
To summarize the brief overview of this subsection and [16], it seems that
choosing Λe to be any full-diversity lattice with a reasonably good sphere-
packing density will be a good choice of lattice. For example, taking Λb a
full-diversity rotation of Zn as conventional and Λe = 2kΛb will yield a good
coset code. We point out that this seemingly simple result is not trivial at
all since for the simpler but related AWGN channel model, it is known that
a coset code Λb = Zn, Λe = 2kZn, or any other choice with orthogonal Λe, is
not a good choice [15, 16].
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis, we studied the design of lattice codes based on algebraic num-
ber theory and geometry. The two main problems considered were the relia-
bility problem of general lattice codes and the physical-layer security problem
of lattice coset codes, both in noisy and Rayleigh fading channels. Good solu-
tions to the former one are known based on algebraic number theory, whereas
the latter one was an open question in the beginning of this work, although
certain number-theoretic quantities had been suggested to yield possible de-
sign criteria.
We reviewed the information theory, lattice code theory, and the alge-
braic number theory relevant to the reliability and security problems. In the
numerical computations, it however turned out that the probability estimate
conventionally studied in the security problem, called the inverse norm sum,
is too loose to order the interesting lattices. Nevertheless, one of the sug-
gested number-theoretic design criteria for the coset code security, namely
minimizing the discriminant of the underlying number field, seemed to pre-
scribe very well the behaviour of a tighter probability estimate. We suggest
that rather than due to its appearance in the inverse norm sum, this hap-
pend since the discriminant determines the sphere-packing density of the
algebraic lattice, and a full diversity of the lattice guarantees the stability
of vector-lengths under fading, hence together resulting in a dense sphere-
packing after random fading. Regardless of the geometric interpretation of
the results, they still pose a number-theoretic problem as all constructions
of full-diversity lattices necessarily involve field extensions.
As the original hypothesis of this thesis turned inaccurate, we call the
reader’s attention to our suggested improvements. Since all of these im-
provements concern geometric properties number-theoretic code designs, we
have chosen not to assimilate their content in the thesis that was almost
complete at the time when the research projects were launched. In subse-
70
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 71
quent work based on the observations made in the numerical computations
[16], we study the reliability of the different probability estimates and, using
the tight ones, motivate geometric design criteria for full-diversity lattices
that are supported by numerical computations. In [15], we study the se-
curity problem of coset codes as in this thesis and [16], but in the simpler
AWGN channel model, and obtain a rigorous result on geometric lattice de-
sign. The ongoing project [17] concerns geometric lattice design based on
the sphere-packing density after fading in channel models more complicated
than the ones considered in this thesis. The sphere packing is related to
both reliability and security problems. The approach of [17] can be seen as a
generalization of the geometric design in Rayleigh fading channels considered
in [16] and the locally diverse lattices addressed in [14].
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Appendix A
Probability bounds
In this appendix, we derive probability bounds for the eavesdropper’s correct
decision probability (ECDP) and the receiver’s error probability (REP) for
the gaussian, Rayleigh fast fading, and Rayleigh block fading channels. The
bound for the ECDP is only valid for lattice coset codes, whereas the bound
for the REP is valid for any coding strategy and any signaling constellation.
The problem of minimizing Bob’s error probability is addressed, e.g., in [2,
23], and the ECDP can be found in [1, 24]. The probability bounds derived
here constitute all the design criteria needed in the optimization of lattice
coset codes. This is since once the dimension of the signaling lattice and the
index |Λb/Λe| have been fixed, then the transition rate of the lattice coset
code is fixed, too.
One may wonder why we derive two bounds, as the two receivers have
the same channel model. However, as dictated by the setup of the wiretap
problem, there is a gap between their channel qualities. Hence, the two
probability bounds should more precisely be considered as expansions of the
probabilities of the same channel in two different limits, poor signal quality
for the eavesdropper and good signal quality for the legitimate receiver. Of
course, neither limit is completely realistic; truly, Λb should be approximately
of Bob’s best resolution of detection and Λe Eve’s. However, an asymptotic
expansion is the best we can do analytically, and an expansion is not an
asymptotic value, so our results will describe the behaviour of the probability
at the good and poor signal quality regimes.
A.1 On considering a single decoding event
All the derivations of this appendix are based on computing the probability
of correct or wrong decoding for a single decoding event. It is appropriate to
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highlight why we can actually do so even in the case of block fading channels.
Namely, in a realistic implementation of a block fading channel in a quasi-
static physical environment, the subsequent fading coefficients are identically
distributed but not independent, and the (approximative) independence of
the components of a fading matrix diag(h) is only achieved by interleaving the
fading coefficients of the different fading vectors h(1),h(2), ... Consequently,
the subsequent fading vectors h(1),h(2), ... can be heavily correlated since
their components with same index are the subsequent realizations of the
fading coefficients.
Now, if Alice transmits lattice vectors x(1),x(2), ... and a receiver (Eve or
Bob) decodes the received vectors to xˆ(1), xˆ(2), ... the natural way to describe
the probability of a decoding error in a quasi-static environment would be
the asymptotic error rate
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
j=1
Ixˆ(j) 6=x(j) . (A.1)
Correct decoding can be described analogously.
The question is whether the limit (A.1) exists (almost surely) and if so,
is it a “number” in the sense of a constant almost sure limit, or a genuine
random variable. The former will occur if the dependencies of h(1),h(2), ... are
mild enough. What is “mild enough” is a nontrivial question in stochastics.
To provide naive examples, if h(1),h(2), ... and hence also the decoding error
indicators were i.i.d., then the Law of Large Numbers would guarantee that
the constant P(xˆ(1) 6= x(1)) is an almost sure limit in Eq. (A.1). If h(1) =
h(2) = ... and hence all the decoding error indicators are i.i.d. but with
corresponding probability P(xˆ(1) 6= x(1) due to noise | fading h(1)) = p, then
the limit again exists but is now given by the random variable p that depends
on h(1).
However, due to the identical distribution of h(j) and hence Ixˆ(j) 6=x(j) , the
expectation of 1
m
∑m
j=1 Ixˆ(j) 6=x(j) is given by the single decoding probability
P(xˆ(1) 6= x(1)) for any m. In particular, if a constant almost sure limit of Eq.
(A.1) exists, as it should by the engineering setup, then the limit is given by
the error probability of a single decoding event. By virtue of this discussion,
we quantize probabilities also in quasi-static channels based on one decoding
event, and call these quantizations simply decoding probabilities.
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A.2 Bounds for the eavedropper’s correct deci-
sion probability (ECDP)
In this subsection, we derive the ECDP bounds for the different channel
models.
A.2.1 The ECDP in gaussian channels with lattice coset
coding
Let us denote the vector transmitted by Alice by x, its equivalence class in
Λb/Λe by [x] and the sending region by R ⊂ Λb. A possible received bit
is denoted by z. The probability Pc,e of a correct guess for the transmitted
vector, using the Voronoi cell criterion presented in Remark 19, is obtained
as the probability of the received vector lying in the Voronoi cell of some
t ∈ [x], i.e.,
Pc,e =
∑
t∈[x]∩R
ˆ
z∈V(t)
gn(z− x)dnz ≤
∑
t∈[0]=Λe
ˆ
z∈V(t)
gn(z)d
nz. (A.2)
Here V denotes the Voronoi cells of Λb and gn(w) = e−‖w‖2/(2σ2e)/(2piσ2e)n/2 is
the standard n-dimensional spherical zero-mean Gaussian distribution func-
tion with variance σ2e . Note that in lack of information about the lattice
we implicitly assumed in the first step that if the noise makes the received
message pop out of the sending region R, the guess is automatically wrong.
The contribution of such events, i.e., the boundary effects, to the overall
probability is hence assumed negligible.
Next, based on the Poisson formula for lattices, one can show that∑
t∈Λe
gn(z + t) ≤
∑
t∈Λe
gn(t),
with equality if and only if z ∈ Λe (see, e.g., [15]). Hence, Eq. (A.2) yields
Pc,e ≤
∑
t∈Λe
Vol(Λb)gn(t). (A.3)
The tightness of this bound has been discussed extensively in [16], concluding
that it is an O(1/σ2) approximation of Pc,e as σ → 0+ and can be used for
comparing lattices for any relevant σ. As σ → ∞, the bound diverges. We
also point out that the same bound can be derived by approximating in the
last step of Eq. (A.2) the gaussian function by its middle-point value in each
Voronoi cell. Analogously, truncating series (A.3) over the sending region is
equivalent to this derivation for the first step of Eq. (A.2).
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A.2.2 The ECDP in Rayleigh block fading channels with
lattice coset coding
Let us next generalize the probability bound for the ECDP in AWGN chan-
nels to Rayleigh block fading channels. Using the standard generalization
procedure described in Sec. 3.3.2, we start from the upper bound (A.3) for
the ECDP:
P{Eve decodes correctly}
(a)
= Ehe{P{Eve decodes correctly | fading he}}
(b)
= Ehe
{
Pc,e;Λe,he ,Λb,he
}
(c)
≤ Ehe
 ∑
t∈Λe,he
Vol(Λb,he)gLm(t)
 . (A.4)
Step (a) is basic conditioning, step (b) uses the fact that Eve performs a
closest-point search on the faded lattice Λb,h — hence the subscripts in
Pc,e;Λe,he ,Λb,he which is otherwise as given by Eq. (A.2) — and step (c) is
substituting the bound of Eq. (A.3). We have added a subscript he to em-
phasize that Eve is considered. It is worth noticing that if we truncate the
series (A.3), then also the series (A.4) will be truncated.
It remains to compute the expectation, given the distribution of |hi|.
First, using the notation of Section 3.3.2,
Vol(Λb,he) = | det(Mhe)| =
(
m∏
i=1
|hi,e|
)L
Vol(Λb).
Next, we change the summation of Eq. (A.4) back to the lattice Λe by
expressing t ∈ Λe,he in terms of vec(X) := x ∈ Λe as
t = diag(diag(hi,e), ..., diag(hi,e))x,
so ti = hi,exi (the subscript i of hi,e interpreted mod L). Hence we can
express the summand in terms of the non-random lattice,
gLm(t) = e
−∑Lmi=1 |hi,exi|2/(2σ2e)/(2piσ2e)Lm/2.
Finally, the expecation we want to find yields
P{Eve decodes correctly}
≤ Vol(Λb)
∑
x∈Λe
Ehe

(
m∏
i=1
|hi,e|
)L
e−
∑Lm
i=1 |hi,exi|2/(2σ2e)/(2piσ2e)
Lm/2
 .
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Next, recall that the elements of x multiplied by the same fading co-
effiecient hi,e are exactly the rows of X. Using this fact and the independence
of the variables |hi,e|, we get
P{Eve decodes correctly}
≤ Vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
Lm/2
∑
vec(X)∈Λe
m∏
i=1
Ehe{|hi,e|Le−
|hi,e|2
2σ2e
∑L
k=1X
2
ik}.
Finally, modelling the absolute values |hi,e| as Rayleigh distributed, we use
the Rayleigh distribution PDF (and some symbolic computation software).
The expectation above can then be calculated by simple integration. The
final result is
P{Eve decodes correctly}
≤ Γ(L/2 + 1)
mVol(Λb)
piLm/2
(
σh,e
σe
)Lm ∑
vec(X)∈Λe
m∏
i=1
1
(1 + ‖Xi‖2 σ
2
h,e
σ2e
)L/2+1
.
(A.5)
It is worth noticing that the model for fading was only specified in this last
step, except the fact that the fading coefficients were assumed independent.
Thus, other fading models can be studied with minor modifications. In Eq.
(A.5), Γ is the standard gamma function and Xi = (Xi1, ..., XiL) is the ith
row of X. We point out that in the original (and so far only) reference [1]
deriving this formula, there is a misprint in the constant of Eq. (A.5) — the
same reference derives the fast fading case separately, and the formula given
here coincides with their fast fading formula by setting L = 1. At this stage,
it is reasonable to make some remarks considering the above formula.
Remark 115. A good sanity check for the formula is to see that the prob-
ability does not depend on the choice of electric-field units. The standard
deviation σe and the components of Xi are in the units of the electric field,
whereas Vol(Λb) is in these units to the power of Lm and all other numbers
are dimensionless. The invariance follows immediately from these substitu-
tions. It is also worth noticing that the expression rather depends on the
quantity γe := σ2h,e/σ2e rather that the parameters σ2e or σ2h,e alone. This was
predicted when we studied the measure of channel quality in Section 3.2.
Remark 116. From this formula we can anticipate that to minimize the
ECDP, X ought to have no zero rows (except in the zero-matrix, which is
unavoidable in a lattice but not in a code).
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A.2.3 The ECDP in Rayleigh fast fading channels with
lattice coset coding
We recall that the Rayleigh fast fading channel is mathematically just the
block fading channel with parameter L = 1. Since it is from the engineering
point-of-view the most important model of wireless communications, we still
state the result separately:
P{Eve decodes correctly} ≤ Vol(Λb)
2m
γm/2e
∑
x∈Λe∩R
m∏
i=1
1
(1 + ‖xi‖2γe)3/2 .
A.3 Bounds for the legitimate receiver’s error
probability (REP)
We derive an upper bound for the legitimate receiver’s error probability
(REP). The bound is valid for any signaling constellation and any code.
A.3.1 The pairwise error probability
In the following subsections, we find an upper bound for the REP in the
considered channel models. This time, we will not do the generalization
step as described in Section 3.3.2, but rather walk it backwards, i.e., treat
the gaussian channel as a special case of a block fading channel, where the
fading coefficients are identically one.
Let us consider here the probability of Bob receiving a wrong lattice,
which is a function of the realizations of the Rayleigh-distributed scaling
coefficients hb. For notational simplicity in what follows, we denote the
sending constellation by Λb and the skewed constellation as Λhb,b, by which
we otherwise denote lattices, even though the derivation does not use the
fact that they are lattices. The bound is derived by computing the pairwise
error probability (PEP) P (x → w|hb), i.e., the probability that x ∈ Λb is
transmitted, but due to the noise Bob interprets it as some Λhb,b 3 t =
diag(diag(|hi,b|), ..., diag(|hi,b|))w, given the fading coefficients.
Let us find an approximation for the PEP for a block fading channel.
Denoting the block diagonal matrix related to block fading channels as D :=
diag(diag(|hi,b|), ..., diag(|hi,b|)), we find a bound
APPENDIX A. PROBABILITY BOUNDS 81
P (x→ w|hb)
≤ P(The received vector Dx + v is closer to Dw than to Dx)
= P(‖Dx + v −Dw‖2 ≤ ‖v‖2)
Cancelling out ‖v‖2 and denoting the diagonal elements of D as hi,b, where
the index i is again interpreted modulo L, computing the vector norms yields
P (x→ w|hb)
≤ P(
Lm∑
i=1
h2i,b(xi − wi)2 + 2
Lm∑
i=1
hi,b(xi − wi)vi ≤ 0).
Now, vi being i.i.d. one-dimensional zero-mean gaussian r.v. with a
variance σ2b , given the realization of the fading coefficients the latter sum
χ :=
∑Lm
i=1 hi,b(xi − wi)vi is a one-dimensional zero-mean gaussian r.v. with
a variance of σ2χ = σ2b
∑Lm
i=1 h
2
i,b(xi − wi)2. Here we also used the channel
model assumption that the fading coefficients hi,b are independent of the noise
variables vi. Denoting the constant first sum as 2A :=
∑Lm
i=1 h
2
i,b(xi − wi)2,
we get
P (x→ w|hb) ≤ Pr(2A+ 2χ ≤ 0)
= erfc(A/σχ),
where erfc(x) is the integral giving the gaussian tail probability
erfc(x) :=
ˆ ∞
t=x
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt.
Finally, we use the approximation erfc(x) ≤ e−x2/2/2 for x ≥ 0 (see below),
yielding our desired PEP bound
P (x→ w|hb) ≤ e−A2/2σ2χ/2. (A.6)
From our definitions of A and σ2χ, it follows that A2/2σ2χ =
∑Lm
i=1 h
2
i,b(xi −
wi)
2/(8σ2b ). Finally,
P{Bob decodes wrong} ≤
∑
w 6=x
P (x→ w|hb)
=
∑
w 6=x
exp(−
Lm∑
i=1
h2i,b(xi − wi)2/(8σ2b ))/2(A.7)
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Let us yet prove the bound erfc(x) ≤ e−x2/2/2 for x ≥ 0. For x = 0 the
bound is trivial. By Markov’s inequality, any random variable V satisfies for
any x > 0
P{V ≥ x} = P{exV ≥ ex2} ≤ e−x2E{exV },
and taking V normally distributed, V ∼ N(0, 1), the above yields, after some
integration
erfc(x) = P{V ≥ x} ≤ e−x2/2/2.
A.3.2 The REP in gaussian channels
In the gaussian channel model, the fading coefficients used above are not
random variables but constants 1. Then, Eq. (A.7) yields
P (Bob decodes wrong | x is transmitted)
≤ 1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb∩R
e−‖x−w‖
2/8σ2b .
This bound can be made uniform in x (provided that Λb is a lattice; this
is the only step where we need the assumption) by extending the summation
to all of Λb,
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
0 6=w∈Λb
e−‖w‖
2/8σ2b .
It is worth noticing that this expression largely resembles the ECDP of a
gaussian channel. Hence, in gaussian channels, the probability bound design
criteria of Bob and Eve coincide. This has been utilized in [15] to show that
orthogonal lattices are always suboptimal in terms of these probabilities.
A.3.3 The REP in Rayleigh block fading channels
To investigate the block fading case, we just average the PEP (A.7) over the
i.i.d. Rayleigh-distributed random variables hi,b since by indicator functions
and conditioning, P{Bob interprets x as w} = Ehb{P (x → w|hb)} . Thus,
compute
Ehb{P (x→ w|hb)} ≤ Ehb{e−A
2/2σ2χ/2}
= Ehb{e−(
∑Lm
i=1 h
2
i,b(xi−wi)2)/8σ2b/2}.
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Recall again that the indices of hi,b were interpreted modulo L, and each hi,b
multiplies the rows of the original matrices X−W, so
Ehb{P (x→ w|hb)} ≤ Ehb{e−(
∑m
i=1
∑L
k=1 h
2
i,b(Xik−Wik)2)/8σ2b/2}.
Finally, we express this in terms of hi,b and use their independence
Ehb{P (x→ w|hb)} ≤
1
2
m∏
i=1
Ehi,b{e−h
2
i,b
∑L
k=1(Xik−Wik)2/8σ2b}.
Now, calculating the expectations with the PDF of hi,e known is just a matter
of integration. As in the ECDP bound, also here we only now specify the
fading model, so the derivation can be generalized. We get
Ehb{P (x→ w|hb)} ≤
1
2
m∏
i=1
1
γb‖(X−W)i‖2/4 + 1 ,
where γb = σ2h,b/σ2b is the measure of Bob’s channel quality and [matrix]i
denotes the ith row vector of a matrix. Hence, finally
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb∩R
m∏
i=1
1
γb‖(X−W)i‖2/4 + 1 .
As for AWGN channels and a lattice Λb, this bound can be made uniform by
extending the summation to Λb and replacing x by 0.
In the limit of Bob’s good signal quality γb →∞, the 1 in the denominator
can be dropped, yielding the asymptotic approximation
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb∩R
m∏
i=1,Xi 6=Wi
4
γb‖(X−W)i‖2 . (A.8)
A.3.4 The REP in Rayleigh fast fading channels
For the important special case of Rayleigh fast fading channels, the upper
bound for the REP becomes
Pe,b ≤ 1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb∩R
m∏
i=1
1
γb‖xi − wi‖2/4 + 1 .
In the limit of Bob’s good signal quality γb →∞,
Ehb{Pe,b(hb)} ≤
1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb
m∏
i=1,xi 6=wi
4
γb(xi − wi)2 .
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Let us yet connect this to what we know about lattice theory. Using the
definitions of `-product distance and the modulation diversity, this becomes
Ehb{Pe,b(hb)} ≤
1
2
∑
x 6=w∈Λb
(
4
γb
)`(x,w)
d(`)p (x,w)
−2,
which points out the two design criteria for a lattice:
i full diversity in order to minimize the factor
(
4
γb
)`(x,w)
,
ii) minimization of the dominant term of the series, equivalently, maxi-
mization of the minimum product distance dp,min(Λb) := minw∈Λb d
(`)
p (0,w).
This is the foundation of number-theoretic lattice design; as it is illustrated
in Example 20, any construction of a lattice with diversity other than one
necessarily uses field extensions. As a sort of a converse, Corollary 113 shows
that full-diversity lattices can be constructed in any dimension using number-
field extensions.
A.4 Geometric designs
Instead of using the analytical bounds derived in the preceding subsections,
AWGN channels allow for a geometric design based on the spherical sym-
metry and fast decay of the PDF of the noise vector. For Bob’s case, it is
a part of the information theory folklore that the sphere-packing density of
Λb measures the reliability of a lattice code. For Eve’s probability and coset
codes, we motivate in [15, 16] a heuristic stating that in this case, the sphere-
packing density of Λe should be maximized. The heuristic is supported by
semi-analytic computations.
Appendix B
Signal qualities relevant for coset
coding
From the engineering setup it is clear that if Eve’s signal is too good, no
physical-layer security helps and, conversely, if Eve’s signal is utterly poor,
no physical-layer security is needed. We give here a motivation to obtain a
rough approximation for this range of interest.
Proposition 117. Optimization of the security of a coset code in an AWGN
channel is relevant roughly in the noise range
Γ(n/2 + 1)1/n
2
√
npi
Vol(Λb)1/n ≤ σ ≤ Γ(n/2 + 1)
1/n
√
pi
Vol(Λe)1/n.
Proof sketch. For the lower bound, note that the ball B(0, 2
√
nσ) is the
smallest one containing the axis-aligned cube with sides [−2σ, 2σ]. Eve will
highly probably have a noise vector inside this ball, so she will “always decode
correctly”, when such a ball will fit inside V(Λb). Then, since Λb should have
a good sphere packing, this will happen when the volumes of the ball and
the lattice are approximately equal.
For the upper bound, complete secrecy is achieved when Eve’s detection
resolution σ is approximately the resolution of the lattice Λe, so we have
required Vol(B(0, σ)) = Vol(Λe). Independently of this, we notice in [16]
that also Λe should have a good sphere packing so this makes sense.
For Rayleigh fast fading channels, using the range above, raising the
inequality to power n, and the standard generalization with E{Vol(Λb,h)} =
σnh yields
Γ(n/2 + 1)1/n
2
√
npi
Vol(Λb)1/n ≤ σ/σh ≤ Γ(n/2 + 1)
1/n
√
pi
Vol(Λe)1/n.
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